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Competitive Intensity as Driver of Innovation and Productivity 
Growth: A Synthesis of the Literature 
 
Abstract 
The objective of the report is to survey and assess the existing economic 
theoretical literature and empirical evidence on the linkages between open and 
competitive markets (competitive intensity) and innovation and productivity growth. The 
report is divided into three main parts. The first part examines the state of economic 
theory on the relationship between competitive intensity, innovation and productivity. 
The second section examines relevant empirical work that has been done on the role of 
firm dynamics in sustaining a competitive environment. The third section surveys 
evidence of linkages provided by the international case studies of the effects of open and 
competitive markets on innovation and productivity. The report concludes that the weight 
of the evidence indicates that competitive intensity has a strong positive effect on 
innovation and productivity. Accordingly, Canada should pay closer attention to the 
competitive implications of public policy than has been the case in the past. The 
international experience provides strong support for this conclusion. While there can be 
negative implications for certain groups from such policy changes, the evidence shows 
that they are often smaller than anticipated. Restrictions on competition should only be 
allowed when it can be demonstrated that they are needed to achieve overriding societal 
interests.   
 
Résumé 
L‘objectif de ce rapport est de passer en revue et d‘￩valuer la litt￩rature th￩orique 
ainsi que les études empiriques portant sur les relations entre les marchés ouverts et 
comp￩titifs (intensit￩ de la comp￩tition) d‘une part et l‘innovation et la croissance de la 
productivit￩ d‘autre part. Ce rapport est divis￩ en trois sections majeures. La premi￨re 
partie examine l‘￩tat de la connaissance ￩conomique sur la relation entre l‘intensit￩ de la 
comp￩tition, l‘innovation et la productivit￩.  La deuxi￨me examine les ￩tudes empiriques 
portant sur rôle de la dynamique des firmes dans le soutien d‘un environnement 
compétitif. La troisième section recense les études de cas internationaux ayant trait aux 
effets des march￩s ouverts et comp￩titifs sur l‘innovation. Ce rapport conclut qu‘apr￨s 
pond￩ration des preuves pr￩sent￩es l‘intensit￩ de la comp￩tition a un puissant effet positif 
sur l‘innovation et la productivit￩. Cons￩quemment, le Canada devrait porter plus 
attention aux conséquences sur la compétition découlant de ses politiques publiques qu‘il 
ne l‘a fait dans le pass￩. Les exp￩riences internationales pr￩sent￩es dans ce rapport 
apportent un support solide à cette conclusion. Bien qu‘il puisse y avoir des cons￩quences 
négatives pour certains groupes résultant de changements de politique, les études à notre 
disposition démontrent que celles-ci sont souvent plus petites qu‘anticip￩es. L‘imposition 
de restrictions à la comp￩tition devrait ￪tre allou￩e que s‘il peut ￪tre d￩montr￩ que ces 





The objective of the report is to survey and assess the existing literature and 
empirical evidence on the linkages between open and competitive markets (competitive 
intensity) and innovation and productivity growth. 
 
The report is divided into three sections. The first section examines economic 
theory and related empirical work on the relationship between competitive intensity and 
innovation.  The second section reviews the literature on the role of firm dynamics, entry 
exit and expansion, in productivity growth. The third section surveys the international 
experience of governments in fostering open and competitive markets or increasing 
competitive intensity, and the effects of these measures on innovation and productivity. 
 
The Relationship between Competitive Intensity, Innovation and Productivity 
 
Much empirical work has been done on the relationship between competitive 
intensity, innovation and productivity. Many studies find that the relationships between 
competitive intensity and innovation, and innovation and productivity, are positive. 
 
The traditional view of innovation relating to market structure, going back to the 
work of Schumpeter, holds that firms in a concentrated market should innovate to a 
greater extent. However, recent research has shown that there is a positive association 
between market competition and the degree of innovation. According to Geroski (1990), 
―it seems reasonable to conclude that actual monopoly has an unambiguously inhibiting 
effect, and that rivalry has an unambiguously stimulating effect on innovativeness.‖ 
 
Apart from identifying the sign of the relationship between competitive intensity 
and innovation, researchers are also interested in ascertaining the shape of that 
relationship, which may be non-linear. One possible shape that this relationship could 
take is an inverted U-shape. In practice, this would mean that in industries where 
competition is low, innovation would also be low. But when there are very high levels of 
competition, innovation will also fall off. However, empirical support for this theory is 
limited and subject to question.  Moreover, its leading proponents, rather than arguing for 
the restriction of competition, emphasize the importance of sustaining competition to 
promote innovation particularly in industries that are close to the technological frontier 
 
Finally, back to the work of Schumpeter, there is a view that large firms innovate 
more intensively than smaller firms. However, firm size has generally not been found to 
be a robust predictor for innovation. In fact, while large firms do spend more on research 
and development (R&D) than smaller firms, due to their size and greater profits, they 
may not be intrinsically more innovative. Indeed, small firms are found be more 
innovative per dollar of R&D. Yet, to fully realize the potential profits from innovation, 
small firms must often be acquired by larger firms, which benefit from easier access to     5 
external funds, economies of scale and scope and more effective marketing of new 
products. In this context, small firms often act as ―incubators‖ for innovative ideas. 
 
The Importance of Firm Dynamics for Innovation and Productivity 
 
Firm dynamics deal with competition as a process rather than as a state of affairs. 
A defining feature of competitive markets is freedom for participants to enter and exit 
markets. Through the process of entry and exit, and growth and decline of individual 
firms, resources are reallocated from less efficient to more efficient businesses. 
 
  Empirical work on firm dynamics provides strong support for open market 
policies as a means to promote productivity. The work indicates that entry, exit and 
expansion of firms play a key role in promoting productivity growth.  As in the case of 
competition, entry appears to be particularly important in industries that are closer to the 
technology frontier.   
 
Competitive Markets as Driver of Innovation and Productivity:  
International Experience 
 
  International experience, overall, supports the existence of a strong link between 
competitive intensity and innovation and productivity. This section of the report reviews 
the international experience related to open and competitive markets as enablers or 
drivers of innovation and productivity.  It reviews research by the OECD and by 
government researchers in the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, the 
European Union and other countries. It then examines the empirical evidence that has 
been gathered by the McKinsey Global Institute and Michael Porter and Associates on 
the role of competitive markets as drivers of innovation and productivity growth.  
 
The OECD has done extensive work on the drivers of innovation and 
productivity. An important component of this work has involved the building of a set of 
quantitative indicators of product market regulation based on questionnaires sent to 
OECD member governments covering three domains: state control, barriers to 
entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment. The main conclusion from this 
OECD research is that regulatory reforms promoting competition tend to boost 
productivity. 
 
Pertaining specifically to Canada, OECD researchers find that Canada‘s overall 
market regulation ranking fell from fourth to eighth among OECD countries from 1998 to 
2003.  Recent OECD research based on the indicators find that if Canada would have 
followed the reforms of the least restrictive country in 1995, productivity growth between 
1996 and 2003 would have been 1 percentage point higher per year. This represents an 
almost 50 per cent increase relative to the actual level of productivity growth over that 
period. 
 
The United Kingdom has the lowest level of product market regulation (tied with 
Australia, according to the OECD). A large quantity of research conducted in the UK     6 
about competition, innovation and productivity, especially by the UK Treasury, the 
Department of Trade and Industry, and the Office of Fair Trading, finds that a  
competitive environment is beneficial to productivity growth and innovation because it 
provides strong incentives for firms to adopt best-practice techniques and engage in 
innovative activity and that harmful side effects of increased competition, which are often 
feared before implementing a reform, are found in many instances to not actually 
materialize. Reflecting the relationship between competition and innovation and 
productivity, this work supports the maintenance of a broad based competition policy 
dealing with anti-competitive private business practices and unnecessary government 
restrictions of competition.   
Australia introduced a program to improve competition in 1995, called the 
National Competition Policy (NCP). The NCP recognized that competitive markets will 
generally serve the interests of the consumers and the community. However, it also 
recognized that in some cases, increased competition may not be desirable, and in these 
cases policies that moderate competition can be beneficial to the community. 
   
Ten years after the introduction of the program, the Australian Productivity 
Commission found that NCP had contributed importantly to productivity increases and 
growth in household incomes; it reduced the prices of goods and services such as 
electricity and milk; it stimulated business innovation; and it helped meet some 
environmental goals such as the efficient use of water. 
   
The United States was a first mover among OECD countries in deregulating 
previously regulated economic activity beginning in the mid-1970s when it deregulated 
the airline industries. It is today a world leader in recognizing the importance of 
competitive forces for raising production efficiency and consumer welfare. According to 
a survey by the Brookings Institution, the United States gained at least US$36 to US$46 
billion annually ($1990) from deregulation, primarily in the transportation industries. 
From these findings, it is concluded that most industries should be deregulated, unless it 
can be shown that price and entry competition will not materialize. 
   
  Other researchers have also conducted important research on the relationship 
between competition and innovation and productivity. Michael Porter, whose work has 
focused on the importance of competition for innovation and productivity, shows that 
local competition and vigorous domestic rivalry promotes success in international 
markets. The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) case studies have found that competition 
intensity has a positive effect on productivity. This effect comes from multiple factors, 
such as concentration (as long as it allows for intense competition), removal of trade 
protections and deregulation. Other factors such as minimum wages, work rules and 
zoning laws also had an indirect effect on productivity. The MGI also highlights the fact 
that competition increases managerial innovation, and that managerial innovation is a key 
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Case Studies 
 
Two case studies are included in the appendices of the report. The first 
investigates the deregulation of the European air passenger transport. Three lessons are 
learned from this experience: 
 
  competition can provide consumers with substantially lower prices, in turn 
stimulating demand and creating new markets; 
  deregulation can produce major gains for consumers without damaging the long-
term profitability of firms; and 
  open and free competition is of crucial importance for productivity growth in an 
industry since it encourages entrepreneurial activity and industry innovation. 
The second case study examines the reorganization of the Canadian wine industry 
after the introduction of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States in 1989. This 
transformation has shed light on how increased foreign competition can drive innovation 
and enhance the competitiveness of an industry. From a protected and inward-looking 
industry not recognized outside Canadian frontiers, the wine industry has now become 




This report concludes that competition has a positive effect on both innovation 
and productivity. International experience provides strong support for this conclusion. 
While there can be negative implications for certain groups from such policy changes, the 
evidence shows that they are often smaller than anticipated. Restrictions on competition 
should only be allowed when it can be demonstrated that overall societal interests are not 
served by a competitive marketplace.     8 
Competitive Intensity as Driver of Innovation and 





I   Introduction 
  The objective of this report is to survey and assess the existing literature and 
empirical evidence on the linkages between open and competitive markets (competitive 
intensity) and innovation and productivity growth. This report reviews and synthesizes 
studies on the relationship between market competitive intensity, innovation, and 
productivity.
2 It is not a comprehensive ―literature review.‖ Instead, it provides a selected 
synthesis of the literature, one that necessarily reflects the exercise of qualitative 
judgment by the authors. It highlights areas where considerable advances in our 
knowledge have been made, but also areas where our knowledge is much more tentative. 
 
  The approach, content, and conclusions reached within the empirical literature 
(both economic and business management streams) are shaped by diverse theoretical 
foundations, assumptions, and methodologies. The economic studies rely on many 
different economic models and theories, including Industrial Organization (IO) 
 models.  
 
  The report is divided into three main parts. The first part examines the literature 
on the still evolving theory on the relationship between competitive intensity and 
innovation. While early theoretical work suggested there may be a negative relationship 
between competition and innovation, most empirical studies have found the relationship 
between competitive intensity and innovation, and between innovation and productivity, 
to be positive. Further, market concentration, when not accompanied by competitive 
intensity, is not usually found to be an enabling condition for innovation or productivity 
growth. 
 
        The second part examines the empirical literature on the role of firm dynamics in 
fostering productivity growth. A defining feature of competitive markets is freedom for 
participants to enter and exit as well as expand or contract in markets. This literature 
indicates that the entry and exit, and the growth and decline of individual firms (―firm 
dynamics‖), by allowing resources to be reallocated from less productive to more 
productive businesses, plays an important role in enabling innovation and productivity 
growth. Accordingly, it emphasizes the importance of open trade and government 
                                                 
1 This report was written by Andrew Sharpe and Ian Currie with contributions from Sharon Qiao, Bonnie 
Gunn, and Simon Lapointe, and with financial support from the Canadian Competition Bureau. The author 
would like to thank Sheridan Scott, Gernot Kofler and Mark Ronayne from the Competition Bureau for 
comments of earlier versions of the report. The views expressed in the report are that of the authors, and do 
not necessarily reflect those of the Competition Bureau.   
2 The report does not examine in detail the degree to which Canada‘s productivity and innovation would be 
enhanced by measures that boost competition, nor identify and analyze the markets where competition may 
be lagging. 
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policies that foster firm entry and exit as drivers of innovation and productivity growth 
and innovation.   
             
  The third part surveys the international experience of governments in fostering 
open and competitive markets or increasing competitive intensity, and its effects on these 
countries‘ innovation and productivity performance. This section includes discussion of 
the experience of the OECD countries, as shown through research work undertaken 
within the OECD, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, and the work of the 
McKinsey Global Institute and Michael Porter and Associates. The evidence in the 
section strongly supports a positive relationship between open and competitive markets 
and productivity and innovation. 
 
 
Measuring Market Structure, Conduct and Performance (SCP) 
 
There are various quantitative measures of market structure (number and size of firms in a market), 
conduct (behaviour of these firms) and performance (market outcomes): 
 
  concentration ratios (CRs) are typically used to measure the proportion of sales or production 
that are accounted for by the largest firms in the industry. As described by Harrison and Rude 
(2004): ―This ratio shows the percentage of total sales that are contributed by the largest firms 
ranked by order of market share. For instance the CR4 measures the market share of the four 
largest firms, while the CR8 measures the market share of the eight largest firms. ...The 
concentration ratio is effective in showing the dominance of the top firms, but it does not 
address the rest of the market nor does it account for the influence of a single firm‖; 
 
  the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) is one alternative measure of concentration and takes 
into account the number of firms and their relative size. It is calculated as the sum of the 
squares of the market shares of each individual firm. However, it is not always clear how the 
HHI should be interpreted. For example, in a small open economy, a strictly national measure 
of concentration may not provide much insight; 
 
  price-cost margin (PCM) indexes are frequently used as a measure of competitive intensity. 
They attempt to measure to the firm‘s ability to set its prices above its marginal costs (i.e., the 
mark-up that firms charge). A widely used PCM index is the Lerner Index (usually defined as 
the difference between price and marginal costs relative to the price). However, marginal costs 
are seldom directly observable and proxies for marginal cost (i.e. average cost) carry their own 
drawbacks (i.e. they generally come from accounting data which may not accurately provide 
measures of cost); 
 
  within the business stream of literature, alternative measures of competitive intensity are 
found. For example, Porter (2001) proposes fluctuations in market share among leading 
competitors, controlling for outside shocks, as a direct and ―far more compelling indication of 
the intensity of competition‖; and 
 
  Ahn (2002) points out that, in measuring the degree of product market competition in a highly 
integrated international market, it may be necessary to consider concentration in world 
markets rather than to focus on domestic markets (hence a reliance on import penetration 
ratio‘s as a measure of foreign competition). 
 
 




A variety of different measures of innovation are commonly used, including R&D spending, patenting 
activity, innovation counts, and total factor productivity (TFP). Each of these is subject to its own 
limitations. For example: 
 
  R&D expenditures are an input to, not an output from, innovation; 
 
  the propensity to patent varies across firms and industries and the distribution of patents' 
economic value is uneven; and 
 
  innovation counts (the number of ―new‖ inventions introduced) are difficult to obtain, exhibit 
variability in quality, and requires subjectivity in choosing what to count. 
 
Such quantitative indicators are also subject to criticism on the grounds that while they may 
(narrowly) capture the creation of new knowledge, they the do not capture its rate of adoption and 
diffusion through the economy.   
 
Economists sometimes use estimates of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth, sometimes called 
multi-factor productivity (MFP), as an indicator of technological change or dynamism. These 
estimates provide the residual output growth once the weighted contributions of changes in capital 
and labour inputs are accounted for.*  However, Richard Lipsey and Kenneth Carlaw (2000, 2004) 
have argued that changes in TFP do not measure technological change, only the super-normal 
returns to investing in such change: 
 
―It seems to us that, whatever TFP does measure, and there is cause for concern as to how to 
answer that question, it emphatically does not measure all of technological change... While 
people are of course free to measure anything that seems interesting to them, the degree of 
confusion surrounding TFP, particularly the assumption that low TFP numbers imply a low 
degree of technological dynamism, would seem to us to justify dropping the measure 
completely from all discussions of long term economic growth. Even if that does not happen, 
as we are sure it will not, every TFP measure should carry the caveat: there is no reason to 
believe that changes in TFP in any way measure technological change.‖** 
 
 
*     Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) note that MFP growth estimates involve a number of assumptions 
concerning both the measurement of output and inputs and stress that estimates of MFP are 
problematic for a number of service industries, especially in level terms, because of the way in 
which both output and inputs are measured.  
 
**   Lipsey and Carlaw, 2000.  
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II   Economic Theory on the Relationship between  
Competitive Intensity and Innovation 
 
This section reviews the literature on the economic theory related to the 
relationship between competitive intensity and innovation. Early economic thinking, 
based on the work of Joseph Schumpeter, posited that concentrated market structures are 
likely to lead to higher levels of innovation.  In essence, concentrated market structures 
provide incumbent firms with both the means (e.g. financial standing) and the incentive 
(e.g. to protect their existing market power) to innovate. In the late 1950s Kenneth J. 
Arrow offered an alternative view: that a monopolist might be less innovative because, in 
bearing the cost of investing in innovation, it gives up the opportunity to continue to earn 
monopoly profits it could enjoy without innovating.
3  
 
Much of the empirical work over the past half-century has fundamentally been 
shaped by these two different views. In summary, the empirical studies show that:  
 
  market concentration in and of itself does not necessarily create a situation of low 
competitive intensity; 
 
  the relationship between competitive intensity and innovation, although generally 
found to be positive, may be ―non-linear‖. There remains considerable uncertainty 
as to the actual non-linear ―shape‖ (if any) that it may take and under what 
circumstances (i.e. there may be differences depending on the industries and 
technologies considered); and 
 
  large and small firms have different innovation advantages they can draw upon, 
some of which are related to market structure and competitive intensity, and yet 
firm size has generally not been found to be a robust predictor of innovation 
performance. 
 
A.   Market Concentration and Competitive Intensity 
 
  That market concentration in and of itself does not necessarily create a situation 
of low competitive intensity is widely recognized and finds its theoretical basis in 
contestable market theory. Contestable market theory suggests that even in a monopoly 
or oligopoly market structure, the incumbent companies will behave competitively should 
barriers to market entry be low. This point is prominently made within the ―business 
management‖ stream of studies. For example, the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), in a 
series of studies analyzing international productivity levels from a business management 
perspective, found that:  
 
                                                 
3 More specifically, Arrow (1959:19) stated that: ―The only ground for arguing that monopoly may create 
superior incentives to invent is that appropriability may be greater under monopoly than under competition. 
Whatever differences may exist in this direction must of course still be offset against the monopolist‘s 
disincentive created by his pre-invention monopoly profits.‖      12 
A high market share held by a small number of firms is not necessarily 
inconsistent with intense competition. Concentration can improve productivity 
through achieving economies of scale, and it can also boost productivity if it 
allows a small number of large firms to compete intensely with each other. 
(Kellison 2004:v) 
 
B.   Market Concentration and Innovation 
 
   There is little empirical evidence to support the view that there is a positive 
association between a high degree of market concentration (in the absence of competitive 
intensity) and innovation. In contrast, three notable studies conducted during the 1990s 
that support (at least within some bounds) a positive association between market 
competition/competitive intensity and innovation, are those by P.A. Geroski, S. Nickell, 




 found little support for assertions about the role of monopoly in 
stimulating innovation and that: ―...our data suggest that the price which has to be paid 
for high levels of innovation may not include tolerating the growth of highly 
concentrated, imperfectly competitive market structures.‖ Geroski‘s findings represent an 
important analytical contribution because he explicitly recognized that market power 
cannot be fully captured by just one variable. Geroski used a number of different 
measures of market power: the extent of market penetration by entrants; market share of 
imports; the relative number of small firms; the change in concentration; the market share 
of exiting firms; and concentration ratios. The measured direct and indirect impact of the 
market power variables on innovation (measured by counts of 4,378 ―significant‖ 
innovations introduced in the UK over the period 1945 - 1983
5) were found to be positive 
and, according to Geroski, ―it seems reasonable to conclude that actual monopoly has an 
unambiguously inhibiting effect, and that rivalry has an unambiguously stimulating effect 
on innovativeness.‖ 
Nickell (1996) drew on micro-level panel data from 700 U.K. manufacturing 
companies (covering the period 1972-1986) to provide evidence that competition, as 
measured by increased numbers of competitors or by lower levels of rents (Lerner Index), 
is associated with a significantly higher rate of total factor productivity growth (TFP). In 
this context, TFP is taken as a measure of an economy‘s long-term technological change. 
Nickell also found differences in average TFP growth rates across different industries and 
                                                 
4 Earlier contributions were made by such economists as Mansfield, Scherer, Nordhaus, Fisher, Termin and 
others.  
5 Geroski discarded the use of R&D expenditures as a proxy for innovation on the basis that: ―R&D 
expenditures are not only likely to be a poor measure of total research activity, but they may actually mis-
measure true research activity with an error which depends on the degree of monopoly.‖ (p.589). Geroski 
(1990:589) also stated that ―R&D expenditures are incurred almost exclusively by large firms whereas 
innovations are produced by large and small firms, suggesting that the research inputs of small firms are 
under-recorded.‖  As summarized in Ahn (2002), from a more recent and much larger data set of around 
143,000 UK establishments over the period 1980-1992, Disney et al. (2003) also found that market 
competition significantly raised productivity levels as well as productivity growth rates. 
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that these were correlated with differences in the level of market competition (measured 
by an index of measures of profitability and concentration) across industries. 
Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) drew on innovation counts as a proxy 
for innovation output. Based on data from 340 firms listed on the London International 
Stock Exchange between 1972 and 1982, they found that: 
 
Within industries it was the high market share firms who tended to commercialize 
more innovations although increased product market competition in the industry 
tended to stimulate innovative activity. A direct effect of innovation was also 
found in the stock market value model (in levels or differences). More 
interestingly, the higher market share firms tended to benefit most from 
innovations. This was confirmed when estimating all equations within a particular 
industry (pharmaceuticals) and when patents were used as an entirely independent 
measure of technological capability. (539) 
 
C.   The Non-linear Relationship between Market Structure and Innovation 
 
A great deal of empirical work has been on the theoretical proposition that the 
relationship between competition and innovation takes an ―inverted U-shape.‖
6 As 
described by Howitt (2004): 
 
. . . [T]he theory predicts that industries in which there is little competition will 
not be innovative because firms in such industries can earn lots of profit even 
without having to innovate. Innovation will also be low in industries where there 
is so much competition that once one firm establishes a technological lead the 
followers are discouraged by their inability to earn profits until they climbed into 
the lead themselves, and the leader finds that because the followers are 
discouraged it does not have to innovate very frequently in order to retain the 
lead. Thus innovation typically takes place most rapidly at some intermediate 
degree of competition between these two extremes. This specific non-linear 
relationship is an extremely robust feature of UK manufacturing data.‖
7 
 
  Aghion (2006) notes that the inverted U-shaped relationship between competition 
and innovation has a behavioural base. Firms have little incentive to innovate if they are 
not stimulated by competition, but too much competition discourages innovation as firms 
are not able to reap the benefits of their efforts. Aghion (2006:4) also points out that the 
significance of competition increases as industries approach the technology frontier:  
                                                 
6 The possibility of an inverted-U shaped relationship was also advanced by F.M. Scherer (1967).  
7  More specifically, Aghion et al. (2005:702) propose that: ―In this model both current technological 
leaders and their followers in any industry can innovate, and innovations by leaders and followers all occur 
step-by-step. Innovation incentives depend not so much upon postinnovation rents, as in previous 
endogenous growth models where all innovations are made by outsiders, but upon the difference between 
postinnovation and preinnovation rents of incumbent firms. In this case, more competition may foster 
innovation and growth, because it may reduce a firm‘s preinnovation rents by more than it reduces its 
postinnovation rents. In other words, competition may increase the incremental profits from innovating, 
and thereby encourage R&D investments aimed at ‗escaping competition.‘‖       14 
 
  … [I]f we restrict the set of industries to those that are closer to their world 
  technological frontier, the upward sloping part of the inverted-U relationship 
  between competition and innovation is steeper than for the whole sample. Thus 
  the concept in terms of innovation, of having too little competition grows as the 
  economy develops and gets closer to the frontier.   
 
The existence of an inverted U-shaped curve is generally not seen, however, as 
supporting more restrictive government competition policies.  In this regard, Howitt 
(2007:1) in his April 2007 commentary for the C.D. Howe Research Institute on 
innovation, competition and growth, unequivocally states that: 
 
Competition policy should not be relaxed in hopes of boosting innovation, 
because more competition actually strengthens the incentive to innovate. Recent 
empirical work points to a positive relationship between product market 




Figure 1: Is there an Inverted U-Shaped Relationship between  




Note:          According to Aghion et al., this figure plots a measure of competition in the x-axis against 
citation weighted patents on the y-axis. Each point represents an industry-year. This data is 
generated by matching the NBER patents database to accounting data on firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (from Datastream). The sample includes 311 firms spanning 17 two-
digit standard industrial classification codes over the period 1970-1994. The scatter shows all 
data points that lie in between the tenth and the ninetieth deciles in the citation-weighted patents 
distribution. 
 
Source:      Aghion et al. (2005).  
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Etro (2004), while not positing an inverted U-shaped relationship between market 
structure and innovation, nevertheless suggests that monopolists/market leaders will 
usually try to innovate rapidly to retain their market share and profits. At the same time, 
Etro also suggests that this result will generally occur in markets where barriers to entry 
by rivals are low.  However, as observed by The Economist (2004): 
 
 If the world works in the way Mr Etro supposes, the fact that a dominant firm 
remains on top might actually be strong evidence of vigorous competition. 
However, observers (including antitrust authorities) may well find it difficult to 
work out whether a durable monopoly is the product of brilliant innovation or the 
deliberate strangulation of competitors. More confusing still, any half-awake 
monopolist will engage in some of the former in order to help bring about plenty 
of the latter. The ease of entry and the aggressiveness of the competitive 
environment are what spur monopolists to innovate so fiercely.
8   
 
  Empirical studies suggesting that less than fully competitive markets may enable 
innovation (or at least may not constrain innovation) have come under criticism from 
outside of the economics profession. For example, Jonathon Baker (2007), a professor of 
law at the American University and previously director of the Bureau of Economics at the 
US Federal Trade Commission, has written that: 
 
Recently, several economists motivated by concerns among researchers working 
in the field of endogenous growth theory have made an heroic effort to address 
many of the problems with the earlier cross-industry studies, and in doing so 
appear to have resurrected the ―inverted U‖ result.  But the modern studies still do 
not control satisfactorily for differences across industries in the extent and rate of 
growth of technological opportunity and in conditions of appropriability. In any 
case, one of the authors [Howitt] interprets this line of research as showing that, in 
general, for the industries studied, ―a strengthening of competition policy is likely 
to have a positive overall effect on innovation,‖ in contradiction to Schumpeterian 
theories. 
 
D. Firm Size as Predictor of “Innovation Performance” 
 
  The relationship of firm size and innovation performance (usually defined in 
terms of R&D expenditures, patenting, or innovation ―counts‖) is the second side of the 
Schumpeterian coin. A Schumpeterian view of the world implies that large firms will 
innovate more intensively than small firms. But firm size has generally not been found to 
be a robust predictor of ―innovation performance.‖ Although large firms may spend more 
on R&D in absolute terms because of their sheer size or profits (but not because they are 
dominant), a number of empirical studies suggest they may not be intrinsically more 
innovative (i.e. after controlling for firm size) than are small firms. Per dollar of R&D 
                                                 
8 Other empirical studies casting doubt on the presence of an inverted U-shaped relationship across all 
industries or countries include Creusen et al. (2006) and Tingvall and Poldahl (2005). 
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expenditures, smaller firms may be more innovative than larger firms in some, perhaps 
many, industries. 
 
  One indicative study is that by Acs and Audretsch (1987). They report on the 
results of an innovation count for large and small firms over a sample of four-digit 
standard industrial classification (SIC) industries and standardized on the basis of 
employment and sales. They conclude that the average innovation rate for small firms 
was about 43% higher than that of large firms in 1982 (number of innovations divided by 
sales), but also that this finding: 
 
... does not imply that the answer to the question, ―Which firm size is more 
innovative‖ is unequivocally ―the small firm.‖ Rather [our findings] suggests that 
the correct answer is: ―it depends – on the particular industry.‖ For example, in 
the tires industry, the large-firm innovation rate exceeded the small-firm 
innovation rate by 8.46, or by about eight innovations per thousand employees. 
Just as the innovation rate is relatively higher for the large firms in the tires 
industry, chemicals, industrial machinery, and food machinery industries, it is 
relatively higher for the small firms in the scales and balances, computing 
equipment, control instruments, and synthetic rubber industries. (569-570) 
 
  Acs and Audretsch test the hypothesis that large firms have the innovative 
advantage in concentrated markets imposing significant entry barriers, while small firms 
should have the innovative advantage in markets more closely resembling the 
competitive model. They conclude that the relative innovative advantage of large and 
small firms is determined both by industry characteristics and by the extent to which a 
market is characterized by imperfect competition: 
 
Industries which are capital-intensive, concentrated, and advertising-intensive 
tend to promote the innovative advantage in large firms. The small–firm 
innovative advantage, however, tends to occur in industries in the early stages of 
the life-cycle, where total innovation and the use of skilled labor plays a large 
role, and where large firms comprise a high share of the market.  At least for these 
industries, the conclusion of Scherer (1980) that markets composed of a diversity 
of firm sizes are perhaps the most conducive to innovative activity is reinforced.  
(573; italics added) 
 
  It remains that most empirical studies have found that small firms generate more 
innovations per dollar of R&D.
9  As stated by Scherer (1992:1422-3): ―... the weight of 
the existing statistical evidence goes against Schumpeter‘s 1942 argument that large 
corporations are particularly powerful engines of technological innovation...‖
10 However, 
as pointed out by Cohen and Klepper (1996), this leads to a pragmatic question: if large 
                                                 
9 In addition, some studies suggest that large firm size is more closely related to process innovation than 
product innovation.  Baldwin and Gu (2004b) for example, found that large firms had higher rates of 
process innovations than small firms, although there was no difference in product innovation rates between 
them.   
10 Scherer also notes, however, that ―doubts nevertheless remain.‖       17 
firms generate fewer innovations per dollar of R&D than smaller firms, as has been found 
repeatedly, how can large firms survive and prosper, especially in R&D intensive 
industries?  Cohen and Klepper (1996) propose that the larger the firm then the greater 
the output over which is can apply the fruits of its R&D (cost-spreading). However, there 
are other potential explanations for why large firms conduct ―more‖ R&D than small 
firms.  For example: Ahn (2002) notes that large firms may have strong advantages in 
particular elements of the commercialization of innovations, including marketing; there 
may be economies of scale and scope in the production of innovations; large diversified 
firms may be in a better position to exploit unforeseen innovations; and large firms may 
have better access to external finance (i.e., large firms may have an advantage in securing 
finance for risky R&D, because size and market power can increase the availability and 
stability of external and internal funds).   
 
  In this context, it is noteworthy that while many smaller firms are important 
incubators for good ideas with good commercialization potential, fully realizing that 
potential sometimes involves their acquisition by larger firms. As Keith Redpath, the 
Chief Executive Officer of the UK company Opal Drug Discovery, stated in his review of 
a recent book on the business of biotechnology (Pisano, 2006): 
 
Pisano contends that the [biotechnology] industry has a failed to deliver 
financially. He may be right, but his analysis is flawed. Many start-up companies 
with promising drug candidates or technologies are acquired by larger companies 
before making a profit, delivering good returns for founders and investors. In 
deciding whether biotechnology has delivered financially, Pisano considers the 
profitability of those that remain independent. But this is not necessarily the best 




Figure 2: Responses to 2006 Canadian Biotechnology and Life Sciences 
Business Survey Question on “Likely Success Scenarios” 
What do you consider to be the most likely 
scenarios for the typical successful 
Canadian life science or biotechnology 






Being acquired/merger 41 32 8
Build or maintain a sustainable business 14 5 18
Going public 14 18 31
Licensing or selling intellectual property 15 29 20
Other 2 2
Grand Total 86 84 79
 
Source:  PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006)      18 
  Redpath‘s views on this subject find support in the results from a 2006 survey of 
Canadian biotechnology industry leaders sponsored by the industry association Biotech 
Canada (see Figure 2 above).   
 
E. Overall Assessment 
 
  The view that market concentration promotes innovation does not find strong 
support among informed observers.
 11 For example, Ahn (2002:5) concludes that: 
 
The claim that market concentration is conducive to innovation does not appear to 
be supported by recent empirical findings. Motivated by Schumpeter‘s conjecture 
that large firms in concentrated markets have advantage in innovation, many 
empirical studies have investigated the relation between market concentration and 
innovation. On the whole, however, there is little empirical support for the view 
that large firm size or high concentration is strongly associated with a higher level 
of innovative activity. 
 
  A review of the empirical literature for the European Commission, conducted by 
European Economics (2003), concludes that: 
 
At a general level, there is some evidence in favour of an inverse-U shape 
between intensity of competition and innovation, indicating that innovation may 
be relatively less rapid at both very low and very high intensities of competition. 
However, there is insufficient practical guidance from the literature to develop 
these ideas into a general theory on this issue, which is perhaps best addressed on 
a case-by-case basis. 
 
  Other observers are even more cautious in finding empirical support for making a 
positive linkage between competitive intensity and innovation. For example, Gaëtan 
Nicodème and Jacques-Bernard Sauner-Leroy (2004:13) state that: 
 
The empirical literature on the link between product market competition and 
innovation has so far been relatively sparse and inconclusive. The reasons lay in 
the poor availability of comprehensive time series of product market indicators, in 
a ―still-in-progress‖ theoretical framework, and in the difficulties of measuring 
dynamic efficiency given that it takes time to deliver its full effects and that 
innovation is difficult to measure. As surveyed by Ahn (2002), studies on the 
relationship between market power and innovation lead to mixed results. For 
example, some studies show that companies‘ size has no significant effects on 
innovation whilst other studies point to either a positive relationship between 
concentration and innovation, or an inverted U-Shaped relationship, or simply no 
effects when controlling for industry differences. Apparently, measurement and 
modelling issues blur empirical results as good proxies for innovation are difficult 
to find and regression methods fail to take into account ―bounds‖ effects between 
R&D intensity and concentration. 
                                                 
11 For a review of this issue, see Gilbert (2006).     19 
 
  Much of the empirical literature investigating the relationships between market 
structure, innovation and economic growth is based on a growth accounting framework 
(where economic growth is modeled on the basis of an aggregate production function). 
As described by Nicoletti and Scarpatta (2003), to the extent that many of the empirical 
studies within that framework yield ambiguous results, this is because:  
 
  the direct measures of competition, such as indices of concentration or mark-ups, 
are plagued with problems of interpretation and accuracy; and 
 
  direct measures are not easily interpretable in terms of policies (i.e. finding an 
effect of market power on productivity provides little direction on what policy 
should be followed to improve outcomes).
12 
 
  It is for this reason that empirical studies on firm dynamics, which generally 
describe competition as a process rather than a state of affairs, are an important and 
complementary area of inquiry. 
 
 
III   The Importance of Firm Dynamics for Innovation and 
Productivity 
 
  A defining feature of competitive markets is freedom for participants to both enter 
and exit. Through the entry and exit, and the growth and decline of individual firms 
(―firm dynamics‖), resources are reallocated from less productive to more productive 
businesses. This is an enabling condition for innovation and productivity growth. This 
section reviews the evidence of the importance of firm dynamics, spurred by competition, 
for innovation and productivity.  
 
A key characteristic of competitive markets is freedom for participants to both 
enter and exit markets. As stated in the OECD‘s January 2007 ―Policy Brief on 
Competition and Barriers to Entry‖ (OECD, 2007a): 
 
Before a firm can compete in a market, it has to be able to enter it. ... Regardless 
of whether there is a consensus on a definition [of an entry barrier], or even 
whether the definition ultimately matters, it is undeniable that the concept of entry 
barriers play an important role in a wide variety of competition matters because it 
is vital to the analysis of market power.  Entry barriers can retard, diminish, or 
entirely prevent the market‘s usual mechanism for checking market power: the 
attraction and arrival of new competitors. (1) 
 
                                                 
12  Nicoletti and Scarpatta suggest that an alternative empirical strategy is to look more directly as some of 
the potential policies that affect competition rather than attempting to directly measure market competition. 
Yet, as these authors also observe, turning qualitative information concerning policies and regulations into 
quantitative data required for empirical analysis also involves assumptions, simplifications and subjective 
choices.     20 
Empirical studies on firm dynamics complement the insights provided by the 
studies on competition, innovation and productivity relationships undertaken within the 
growth accounting framework. This is because much of the empirical work on firm 
dynamics, rather than relying on static measures of firm populations, seek to measure the 
amount of change taking place within these populations (Baldwin and Gellatly, 2006).
 As 
highlighted below, empirical work in the field of firm dynamics suggests that: 
 
  firm dynamics, at least in developed countries, can be described with reference to 
a number of ―stylized facts‖, including firm entry and exit and variation in sizes 
and market shares of continuing units (mobility); 
 
  high levels of firm entry and exit is one indication of competitive markets doing 
their job in moving resources to where they can be used to greatest economic 
advantage. There are different views (and different empirical results) on whether 
the major contribution of firm dynamics to productivity growth is through within-
firm efficiency improvements or through reallocation of resources across 
incumbents; and 
 
  it remains uncertain what contribution the continual ―churning‖ through entry and 
exit of firms may be to innovation performance either at the firm or economy-
wide level. 
 
A.   The Stylized Facts of Firm Dynamics and Canadian Findings 
   
Drawing on literature reviews and empirical research by Bartlesman, 
Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2004) 
 and Canadian findings reported by Baldwin and 
Gellatly (2006), 
 there is a strong consensus on what may be called the ―stylized facts‖ 
with respect to entry and exit and variation in sizes and market shares of continuing units 
(mobility). Baldwin and Gellatly point out with reference to their findings on the 
Canadian situation that while each of the turnover processes – greenfield entry (the entry 
of new firms via the building of new plants) and closedown exit (the exit of firms via the 
close down of plants), acquisition entry and divestiture exit, and continuing plant 
turnover – is important by itself, it is the joint effect of the three that is striking. 
 
i.   Firm size and growth 
 
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2004) find that: 
 
  the probability of survival tends to increase with firm (or plant) size; but, 
conditional on survival, the proportional rate of growth of a firm decreases 
with size; and  
 
  for any given size of firm, the proportional rate of growth is smaller the older 
the firm, but its survival probability is greater. 
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These findings are consistent with firm dynamics in Canada. Baldwin and 
Gellatly (2006) find that small firms tend to gain market share and grow over time and 
large firms tend to lose market share and decline over time. For example, greenfield 
entry of firms that entered from 1970 to 1979 accounted for, on average, 16.1 per cent of 
1979 industry shipments; in 1970, firms that were to close by 1979 accounted for 18.2 
per cent of industry shipments. Greenfield entry, close down and exit therefore have a 
significant cumulative impact when measured over time.  
 
ii.   Firm entry, exit and turnover 
 
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2004) find that: 
 
  there is a high degree of total firm turnover (entry plus exit rates) for firms 
with over 20 employees, between 3-8 per cent in most industrial countries and 
more than 10 per cent in some of the transition economies; and  
 
  these data confirm previous findings that in all countries net entry (entry 
minus exit) is far less important than the gross flows of entry and exit that 
generate it. This suggests that the entry of new firms in the market is largely 
driven by a search process rather than augmenting the number of competitors 
in the market. 
  
In Canada, Baldwin and Gellatly (2006) find that firm turnover is a significant 
feature of the Canadian economy, with both entry and exit rates reflecting a rational 
―experimentation process‖ undertaken by firms within competitive marketplaces. For 
new firms in both goods and services industries in Canada, only one in five new firms 
survives beyond its first decade of life. There are large differences in the initial survival 
rates across industries, but over 10 years these differences are substantially reduced. High 
exit rates reflect rational choices that are influenced by the magnitude of experimentation 
costs. 
 
iii.   Reallocation of outputs and inputs  
 
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2004) find that there is a high pace 
output and input reallocation across businesses that:  
 
  is largely within narrowly defined sectors;  
 
  differs substantially across sectors and firm characteristics (e.g., there is much 
more churning among young and small businesses than among old and large 
ones); and  
 
  where entry and exit of businesses account for a substantial fraction of the 
variation and the positive correlation between gross entry rates and gross exit 
rates across industries helps account for the differences in churning rates 
across sectors.     22 
 
Baldwin and Gellatly (2006) find that in an average industry, 44 per cent of all 
market share is shifted from decliners to growers over a decade. By itself, this testifies to 
the importance of competition for shifting resources to more productive uses. The size of 
the turnover process increases with the period of time over which death and renewal via 
entry are measured. They note that over a decade, 35 per cent of jobs in manufacturing 
disappear because of either exit or decline in incumbents. Over a period of forty years, 80 
per cent of jobs disappear. An equally high percentage of jobs appear because of the birth 
of new plants or because of the expansion of existing plants. 
 
B.   Firm Dynamics and Innovation 
 
The empirical work on the role of innovation within the firm in shaping the survival 
probability is of recent vintage. The available studies suggest that, perhaps especially for 
small and young firms, their ability to innovate is likely positively related to their 
probability of surviving. 
 
Cefis and Marsili (2005) find that the firms most likely to exit and disappear from 
the market are small and young firms. The effect of size and age is shaped, however, by 
the extent firms do engage in innovative activities. In general, their results show that the 
ability to innovate increases survival probabilities for all firms and across most industrial 
sectors. They label this as the ‗innovation premium‘ associated with survival. In 
particular, this premium is highest for small and young firms. They find that small, young 
firms that ―innovate‖ have a 23 per cent greater chance of surviving than those that do not 
innovate. 
 
  One set of Canadian studies probing the relationship between firm dynamics, 
innovation and productivity is that produced by John Baldwin and collaborators from 
Statistics Canada over the past decade. Baldwin and Gellatly (2006:33) summarize the 
results of this study program as follows: 
 
Moreover, simple prescriptions related to the need for more R&D can obscure an 
important fact: the dimensionality of innovation is not invariant to basic 
differences in the operating environment. Our research has found that innovation 
strategies tend to be context-bound, that is, the sets of strategies and activities that 
firms rely on to develop and support innovation will depend, in substantive ways, 
on the competitive dynamics that define the market place in which these firms 





C.   Firm Dynamics and Productivity Growth 
 
Numerous growth accounting studies have shown that total factor productivity 
and labour productivity are largely accounted for by the reallocation of outputs and inputs     23 
from less productive to more productive businesses.  Studies of firm dynamics strongly 
support this finding and underline the importance of competitive intensity to this result. It 
has also been found that, at least with respect to the entry of new firms, a positive impact 
on productivity is unlikely to emerge in the short run. As previously mentioned, many 
entering firms may be ―experimenting‖ and may not have initial productivity levels on 
par with existing incumbents.  
 
One focus of recent research attention, and the continuing subject of inquiry and 
vigorous debate, is the relative contribution to labour productivity growth of ―within-
firm‖ or ―between-firm‖ effects of resource allocation. Baldwin and Gu (2006a) note that 
many empirical studies have shown that substantial resources are reallocated across 
producers as a result of the growth and decline process that is continuously transferring 
market share from some firms to others (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1988; Baldwin, 
1995; Mata, Portugal and Guimaraes, 1995; Caves, 1998; and Davis, Haltiwanger and 
Schuh, 1998). Baldwin and Gu note that a number of studies examining the reallocation 
of resources through firm dynamics find that it accounts for very little of aggregate 
labour productivity growth and that, instead, the main source of labour productivity 
growth comes from labour productivity growth within plants. However, Baldwin and Gu 
(2006a:8-9) suggest that these past studies are flawed: 
 
... [W]e argue that most previous studies underestimate the contribution of 
competition to labour productivity growth. The literature on competitive 
advantage and corporate strategy views competition as a process whereby 
businesses gain markets from their competitors. It focuses on the various 
corporate strategies related to the development of marketing, advertising, and 
technology that contribute to the growth of successful corporations (Porter, 1985). 
These strategies are aimed at gains in market share. However, most of the existing 
studies on ‗reallocation‘ focus not on product markets but on labour input 
markets. In this paper, we argue that this leads them to incorrect conclusions. 
Firms do not compete for their share of labour markets; they compete over their 
share of product markets. If we are to understand the impact of competition in 
product markets, we need to examine the effect of turnover directly in these 
markets. 
 
  They go on to provide their own estimates of aggregate productivity growth for 
both the 1979-to-1989 and 1989-to-1999 periods for manufacturing industries (but not 
service industries) in Canada.  For both periods, they find about 70 per cent of aggregate 
productivity growth was due to output reallocation arising from net entry and the growth 
and decline of continuing firms. The remaining 30 per cent is accounted for by 
productivity growth at continuing firms. 
 
  Nevertheless, the debate over the relative importance for productivity of ―between 
firm effects‖ and ―within-firm effects‖ of resource allocation as shaped by firm dynamics 
is not yet settled. For example, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2002) note that most 
evidence on the connection between reallocation and productivity dynamics for the U.S. 
and other countries comes from the manufacturing sector. Drawing on an establishment-    24 
level data set of U.S. retail trade businesses, they find that virtually all of the productivity 
growth in the U.S. retail trade sector over the 1990s is accounted for by more productive 
entering establishments displacing much less productive exiting establishments but that 
―much of the between-establishment reallocation is a within, rather than between-firm 
phenomenon.‖ (2) 
 
D.   Overall Assessment of Firm Dynamics 
   
We now know a considerable amount (or at least more than we knew even ten 
years ago) about the ―stylized facts‖ of firm dynamics both internationally and in Canada. 
The evidence continues to mount that competitive markets increase dynamism (defined in 
terms of entry and exit, turnover and churning, and mobility) and efficient resource 
reallocation. For example, Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, Scarpetta (2004:3-4) conclude that: 
 
 A rapidly growing number of studies provide evidence of heterogeneity in firm 
behaviour, even within narrowly-defined industries or markets. As such, the 
efficiency of an economy in dealing with such reallocation is important not only 
for the productivity dynamics of the economy, but also for the dynamics of the 
labour market. For all these reasons, firm-level dynamics appear to be crucial for 
the relative success of developed economies and also for the trajectories and 
emerging economies as they develop and open up markets. 
 
Ahn (2002:8) has also recognized the importance of firm dynamics for 
productivity (although he is less definitive with respect to its contribution to innovation 
performance):  
 
Firm dynamics (i.e., birth and death, growth and decline of individual firms) make 
an integral part of dynamic competition. An increasing number of theoretical and 
empirical studies focussed on firm-level or plant-level dynamics show that 
aggregate productivity of an industry is significantly affected by compositional 
changes in the industry due to firm dynamics. Dynamic competition incessantly 
weeds out less efficient firms from more efficient ones and reallocates productive 
resources from shrinking/exiting firms to entering/growing firms. 
 
 
IV   Competitive Markets as Drivers of Innovation and Productivity 
Growth: International Experience 
 
  The first two sections of this report focused on the general relationship between 
competitive intensity and innovation and on the importance of firm dynamics for 
innovation and productivity. This section of the report reviews the international 
experience related to open and competitive markets as enablers or drivers of innovation 
and productivity.   
 
  The first sub-section reviews the work that the OECD had conducted on the 
sources of economic growth in OECD countries, which identified competition as a main     25 
driver, and as well as the OECD work on the impact of competitive intensity on 
economic performance. The second sub-section discusses the UK experience. Identified 
by the OECD as the member country with the lowest degree of product market regulation 
(tied with Australia), the UK offers many lessons as a country that has focused on open 
and competitive markets to drive innovation and productivity. The third sub-section 
examines the Australian experience, again a country with a very high level of competitive 
intensity given its very low degree of product market regulation (tied with the UK for 
lowest in the OECD). The impact of National Competition Policy (NCP) reforms on 
Australian economic performance is synthesized. The United States, which the OECD 
ranks third lowest in terms of the degree of OECD product market regulation is discussed 
in the fourth sub-section, the European Union in the fifth sub-section, and other countries 
(Ireland, Finland, and Sweden) in the sixth. The next two sub-sections look at the 
empirical evidence that has been gathered by the McKinsey Global Institute and Michael 
Porter and Associates on the role of competitive markets as drivers of innovation and 
productivity growth. The final sub-section presents case studies of the Canadian wine 
industry and the European passenger air transport industry. 
 
  Despite conflicting views and empirical results on specific matters, the overall 
weight of various studies on the international experience supports drawing a positive 
association between competitive markets, innovation and productivity growth. 
Nonetheless, it also appears that actual results of any given government policy, including 
those that may be ―competition friendly,‖ may be accompanied by unanticipated 
economic consequences no matter what their theoretical impact may be on innovation 
and productivity.
13   As Giuseppe Nicoletti and Stefano Scarpetta (2003:18) observed in 
their empirical study on regulation, productivity and growth in OECD countries:  
 
Assessing and comparing across countries the friendliness of regulatory policies 
to competition involves conceptual and interpretative issues. While it is relatively 
easy to point out broad policy measures aimed at increasing market openness and 
competitive pressures (e.g. trade liberalisation, administrative simplification), the 
impact on incentives and competition of some aspects of regulatory reform is less 
easy to assess. For instance, the extent to which privatisation increases market 
pressures on the management of privatised firms is somewhat controversial. 
                                                 
13 Economic theorists will recognize this statement as reflecting the insights derived from the ―theory of the 
second-best.‖ In this regard, Richard Lipsey (2007:362) has written that: ―When the intuitive appreciative 
approach is used, both to defend the market economy and to assess policies, it is easier to spot counter 
productive advice. According to the appreciative approach, since the competitive market economy is the 
best known method of allocating resources, departures from it through either public policy or private 
behaviour, are regarded as prima facie undesirable, unless justified by well-reasoned arguments and 
persuasive evidence. This is sufficient to rule out the kinds of massive tariffs that used to be found in many 
developing countries, but not to rule out carefully designed, administered and sunsetted infant industry 
tariffs. It also rules out private sector actions in restraint of competition, again unless there are very good 
reasons for them. Highly elaborate theory is not necessary in these cases and many others like them. What 
is needed is a good appreciative understanding of how the price system works, as well as understanding the 
cautionary warning from second best theory that any policy may have unexpected and undesirable 
consequences in apparently unrelated parts of the economy that need to be watched for and mitigated where 
necessary. Useful piecemeal policy advising is not impossible; neither can it be determined purely 
scientifically; instead it is an art, assisted by good economics, both theoretical and empirical.‖     26 
Similarly, the jury is still out on precisely which regulatory policies are conducive 
to stronger competition in industries where potentially-competitive markets 
coexist with elements of natural monopoly. Moreover, turning qualitative 
information concerning regulations into quantitative data necessary involves 
assumptions, simplifications and subjective choices. 
 
A.   OECD Work on Product Market Regulation, Competition and  
Economic Performance 
   
Since the late 1990s the OECD has undertaken a major research program on the 
relationship between product market regulation and economic performance.
14 One major 
output from this research was published in 2003  by Niocletti and Scarpetta (―Regulation, 
Productivity and Growth: OECD Evidence‖) and its results were updated by Conway, 
Janod and Nicoletti in 2005.
15  Their 2003 report identified the main elements of the 
―sweeping product market reforms‖ implemented over the past two decades in many 
OECD (and non-OECD) jurisdictions over the 1984-1998 period as: 
 
(i)  privatization; 
(ii)  entry and price liberalization of potentially competitive domestic 
markets; 
(iii)  pro-competitive regulation of natural monopoly markets (e.g. by 
regulating access to networks); and  
(iv)  liberalization of international trade and foreign direct investment.  
 
The intended results of these reforms, as Niocletti and Scarpetta note, were to increase 
competition and improve corporate governance.  Together, these outcomes should foster 
an environment that is conducive to economic growth. Nicoletti and Scarpetta set out to 
determine if this is the case through the construction of a new set of economy-wide and 
industry level regulatory indicators that involved ―turning sparse and mostly qualitative 
information into cardinal values that allow ranking countries‘ regulations according to 
their potential impact on governance and competition‖ (30).  
 
  The indicators developed by Nicoletti and Scarpetta are derived from the results 
of questionnaires sent to OECD member governments. They are policy focused, 
                                                 
14 This research work has also contributed to the large OECD research program on economic growth 
(published in the documents Sources of Economic Growth (OECD, 2003) and Understanding Economic 
Growth (OECD, 2004c)).  The OECD growth project analyzed the sources of economic growth based upon 
aggregate data and using cross-country regression analysis, with a particular emphasis on the ways in 
which policies affect outcomes.  At the macro level, the OECD growth project identified education, 
innovation, deregulation and investment as the basic determinants of productivity growth. It has also 
identified inflation, fiscal policy, international trade, and the financial system as policy and institutional 
determinants of growth. At the industry and firm level, the OECD has identified market conditions, 
competition, and innovation and R&D as key productivity drivers. See Sharpe (2006) for a synthesis of the 
growth project findings. 
15 Other OECD working papers on product market competition and economic performance have been 
published for specific member countries including: France (Hoj and Wise, 2006), Canada (Maher and 
Shaffer, 2005), Germany (Fuentes, Wurzel and Reindl, 2006) and the United States (Suppanz, Wise and 
Kiley, 2004).     27 
economy-wide, and ‗objective‘ in the sense that they were not based on opinion surveys 
and did not incorporate information about market outcomes. The indicators cover three 
policy domains: state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to trade and 
investment. Using this same set of indicators, Conway, Janod and Nicoletti‘s updated 
2005 analysis found that: 
 
  regulatory impediments to product market competition have declined in the 
OECD area in recent years. The extent of government involvement in product 
markets and barriers to international flows of capital and trade has fallen 
considerably. The fall in barriers to entrepreneurship has been slightly less 
significant. Notwithstanding recent progress in product market reform, across 
virtually all countries a ‗hard core‘ of regulations that impede competition still 
persists in some areas, such as barriers to entry in non-manufacturing industries; 
 
  product market regulation has become more homogenous across the OECD in the 
past five years, as countries with relatively restrictive product market policies 
have moved towards the regulatory environment of the more liberalized countries. 
However, despite a degree of convergence in product market regulation, 
differences between broad groups of countries that have ‗relatively liberal‘ and 
‗relatively restrictive‘ regulatory environments are still significant; 
 
  the overall approach to product market regulation has become more consistent 
across regulatory domains within many OECD countries, suggesting that recent 
reform efforts may have been focused on areas where regulation was previously 
particularly heavy. Also, countries with restrictive overall product market 
regulations tend to have a more heterogeneous approach to competition across 
different policy areas, which may imply additional efficiency losses; and 
 
  as was the case in 1998, cross-country correlations between different aspects of 
product market regulation are also apparent in the 2003 indicators. Domestic 
impediments to competition tend to be lower in countries that have lower barriers 
to foreign trade and investment suggesting a link between a country‘s degree of 
openness and domestic policy reform. In addition, restrictive economic 
regulations still tend to be associated with burdensome administrative 
environments, and legal barriers frequently block new entry into sectors in which 
publicly-controlled companies operate. Product market regulation also appears to 
be linked to employment protection legislation, raising the question of whether 
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Figure 3 (continued): 




Note:  Sorted by 2003 values. The scale of indicators is 0-6 from least to most restrictive of 
competition.  
 
*  EU 15 (simple average) 
 
Source:  Conway, Janod, and Nicoletti (2005)     30 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta pointed out in their original 2003 study that regulatory reforms in 
OECD countries (as proxied by their regulatory indicators) are important explanatory 
variables for multifactor productivity growth rates (and divergence between) OECD 
countries and concluded: 
 
  regulatory reforms promoting private governance and competition (where these 
are viable) tend to boost productivity. Both privatization and entry liberalization 
are estimated to have a positive impact on productivity;  
 
  In manufacturing the gains from product market reform are greater the further a 
given country is from the technology leader, suggesting that regulation limiting 
entry may hinder the adoption of existing technologies, possibly by reducing 
competitive pressures, technology spillovers, or the entry of new high tech firms; 
and  
 
  These results offer an interpretation to the observed recent differences in growth 
patterns across OECD countries, in particular between large Continental European 
economies and the United States. Strict product market regulations— and lack of 
regulatory reforms—are likely to underlie the relatively poorer productivity 
performance of some European countries, especially in those industries where 
Europe has  accumulated a technology gap (e.g. ICT-related industries). 
 
Based on these same OECD indicators of product market regulation for 1998 and 
2003, Conway, de Rosa, Nicoletti, and Steiner (2006) investigate the effect of product 
market regulation on the international diffusion of productivity shocks or technological 
improvements. They find that restrictive product market regulations slow the process of 
adjustment through which best practice production techniques diffuse across borders and 
new technologies are incorporated into production processes.  
  
  This finding has important policy implications. In particular, it implies that 
remaining differences in product market regulation may partially explain the recent 
observed divergence in productivity growth in OECD countries given the emergence of 
general purpose technologies over the 1990s. The authors find that, in times of rapid 
advances in the production/technology frontier, the positive effect of pro-competitive 
regulations on the speed of catch-up is amplified, increasing the dispersion of 
productivity levels across countries in which the stringency of product market regulations 
differs. The authors also find very large productivity gains from product market reform, 
especially for countries operating far from the world productivity frontier. They estimate 
that for the nine countries considered, the increase in annual productivity growth if these 
countries were to align regulation in non-manufacturing sectors on that of the least 
restrictive OECD country, would be more than 0.75 percentage points.
16 
                                                 
16 The aggregate indicator of regulatory conditions is for seven non-manufacturing sectors – transport 
(airlines, railways, road freight), energy (gas, electricity), and communications (post and telecoms). 
Manufacturing is excluded but this sector is typically lightly regulated and open to international 
competition. This indicator is highly correlated with the economy-wide product market regulations     31 
 
Figure 4: Increase in Average Annual Business Sector Productivity Growth 1995-
2003 Given a Move to Sectoral Regulations that are Least Restrictive of 
Competition in 1995 
 
   
Note:  Data are the average increase in annual business-sector productivity over the period 1995 to 2003 
given an easing in regulation to the least restrictive of competition in non-manufacturing sectors in 
OECD countries in 1995. Productivity in the productivity leader in each sector is assumed to grow 
at 1.6% per year. The business-sector results are calculated as weighted averages of the sectoral 
productivity increases using value added weights. 




Figure 5 (below) shows Canada‘s performance according to OECD product market 
regulation indicators and as reported by Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005).  Their 
analysis indicates that for Canada: 
 
  in absolute terms, product market barriers are below 2 on a scale of 0 to 5 where 0 
is the least restrictive and 5 the most restrictive; 
 
  in all three policy domains, Canada moved slightly to a less restrictive product 
regulatory environment between 1998 and 2003;  
 
  in 1998, Canada ranked as one of the OECD countries with the least restrictive 
product market regulations, ranking among the four least restrictive countries in 
two of the three policy domains. Canada ranked average (13
th out of 28) in 
barriers to trade and investment; and  
 
  despite the absolute trend toward deregulation in Canada between 1989 and 2003, 
other countries made even bigger moves and Canada‘s relative ranking 
deteriorated in all three policy domains and, in aggregate, from fourth to eighth. 
                                                                                                                                                 
indicator constructed by Conway, Janod, and Nicoletti (2005). See Conway and Nicoletti (2006) for details 
on the indicator.      32 
 




Note:   The state control domain includes sub-domains on public ownership and involvement in business 
operations; the barriers to entrepreneurship domain includes sub-domains on administrative 
barriers to start-ups, regulatory and administrative opacity, and barriers to competition; the barriers 
to trade and investment domain includes explicit barriers to trade and investment and other 
barriers.   
 
Source: Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005), Tables 21-24.  
 
 
The most problematic policy domain for Canada according to this analysis is with 
respect barriers to trade and investment, where Canada ranked 22nd out of 28 countries in 
2003.  However, it should be noted that this specific finding, and the methodology upon 
which is based, has been subject to challenge.
17  For example, the Conference Board of 
Canada (2008) argued that: 
 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), Canada has among the world‘s most restrictive regulatory barriers to 
foreign investment. However, the OECD rankings are fairly (if not significantly) 
skewed. As Foreign Investment Review Regimes: How Canada Stacks Up reveals, 
the OECD‘s restrictiveness calculations are heavily weighted toward the existence 
of overt, explicit foreign investment screening requirements, while ignoring a host 
of opaque barriers such as political interference and state-owned enterprises. 
                                                 
17  To the extent that the OECD product market indicators suggest Canada has a relatively high degree of 
competitive intensity, Chen (2006) has observed that they stand in contrast to a perception that competitive 
intensity in Canada is significantly lower than in the United States and many other developed countries.  
These perceptions are often based on opinion surveys of executives and the factors that influence these 
opinions may not bear much resemblance to the measures of competitive intensity used by economists. 
Moreover, concentration ratios, as measured, for example, by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, also point 
to a less rosy competitive situation for Canada than painted by the OECD product market regulation 
measures, as has been pointed out by Crepeau and Duhamel (2006) and Thille (2006). On the other hand, 
many economists argue that for the traded good sectors concentration ratios based on the number of 
domestic competitors are not particularly meaningful in an open economy such as Canada where these 
industries are subject to intense competition from imports.     33 
When both implicit and explicit barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI) are 
considered, Canada is found to be no less restrictive than France, Germany, and 
Italy, which, in turn, are less open to FDI than their OECD rankings would 
suggest. (1) 
 
  Notwithstanding the methodological limitations of the OECD work on product 
market regulation,
18 it remains that the weight of the empirical evidence suggest that all 
countries, including Canada, stand to benefit from further product market regulatory 
reform.  For example, the analysis by Conway et al. found Canada to have the fourth 
largest potential gains (after Greece, Portugal, and Norway) from regulatory reform. The 
OECD estimates that business sector productivity growth over the 1996-2003 period in 
Canada would have been 1 per cent per year higher if the country had moved in 1995 to 
the sectoral restrictions in OECD countries that were the least restrictive of competition 
that year. As this business sector labour productivity growth in Canada (output per hour) 
was only 1.9 per cent over the 1995-2003 period, this represents more than a 50 per cent 
improvement in productivity growth and massive increase in wealth creation (nearly 
$100 billion on a cumulative basis).  
 
B.   The United Kingdom (UK) 
 
  This section highlights three UK government-authored reports that provided the 
analytical underpinnings for UK policy actions taken over the past eight years: the UK 
Treasury‘s 2000 report on Productivity in the UK: The Evidence and the Government 
Approach; a 2004 report The Benefits from Competition commissioned by the UK 
Department of Trade; and the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 2007 report Productivity 
and Competition. Taken together, these reports also illustrate how many of the theoretical 
concepts discussed earlier in this paper find practical expression in government economic 
policy analysis and advice. 
 
In 2000, the UK Treasury released a report entitled Productivity in the UK: The 
Evidence and the Government Approach.  The report set out the Government‘s analysis 
of the productivity challenge for the UK and a strategy for raising productivity through 
the promotion of ―economic stability‖ and microeconomic reform.  
 
The report‘s starting point is that the UK faced a major labour productivity gap 
with its main competitors: with the United States (a 45 per cent gap in 1999); with France 
(an 18 per cent gap); and with Germany (an 11 per cent gap). According to the report, if 
the UK were to match the productivity performance of the United States for example, 
                                                 
18 The OECD research work suggests that the impact of government policies in any given case may be 
ambiguous, have consequences for other economic sectors outside of the target sector that may be difficult 
to anticipate and measure, and almost certainly will be dependent on the specific market conditions 
(including degree of market concentration, industry characteristics, etc.) at hand. It should also be noted 
that the OECD product market regulation measures attempt to capture the impact of public policy on the 
competitive environment. Concentration ratios, on the other hand, attempt to gauge the structure of 
markets, as represented by the degree of dominance of the largest firms. These are different phenomena. It 
is very possible that a country could have at the same time low levels of product market regulation and high 
concentration ratios, or vice versa.     34 
output per head would be over £6,000 higher. According to the report, ―The challenge for 
the Government is to achieve its long-term economic ambition to have a faster rise in 
productivity than its main competitors as it closes that gap.‖ 
   
  The report‘s detailed commentary on the reasons for the emergence of the 
productivity gap (and potential measures to close it) covers much ground but continually 
returns to focus on the central role of competitive markets and competitive intensity: 
 
 Competition plays a central role in driving productivity growth. It encourages 
firms to innovate by reducing slack, putting downward pressure on costs and 
providing incentives for the efficient organization of production. It also 
reorganizes market structures, by reallocating resources away from inefficient 
firms to more productive competitors and new entrants. 
 
Notably, the report reflects many of the ideas and economic policy themes on the 
relationship between competitive intensity, innovation and productivity previously 
described in this paper.  For example: 
 
  the report cities the studies by Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenan (1995) and 
Nickell (1996) that found that various measures of competitive pressure in a 
sector have a positive impact on firm efficiency and productivity growth rates. 
Increases in the size of market shares and the size of supernormal profits earned 
by firms, both of which are positively associated with market power, have a 
negative impact on future productivity growth. Similarly, the wide distribution of 
productivity outcomes is itself consistent with a lack of competitive pressure and 
is found to be negatively correlated with productivity growth at the sector and 
firm level; 
 
  the report takes notes of the importance of firm dynamics, with entrepreneurial 
ability in creating new businesses being an important source of competitive 
pressure.  The report states that: ―New entrants and the threat of entry are also a 
critical component of effective competition, and a source of innovation. The 
powerful impact of competition on productivity growth through new entrants is 
highlighted by recent plant-level studies. In general, plants that exit from the 
market are less productive than the average plant. New entrants also start off less 
productive than incumbents, but thereafter rapidly improve their performance so 
that in aggregate, exit and entry provides an important mechanism by which 
resources are reallocated from less to more productive firms. Attempts to quantify 
this effect in the US and the UK have led to broadly similar results attributing 30-
50 per cent of productivity growth in manufacturing to exit and entry effects;‖  
 
  the report highlights the evidence from firm and plant-level analysis and suggests 
that the key to increasing UK productivity growth lies in improving firms‘ access 
to the inputs and resources they require to raise their productivity and creating a 
competitive environment in which they are encouraged to do so. One area of 
particular importance is competition. It reduces slack and makes a continuous     35 
stream of innovations a critical ingredient to business success. It provides strong 
incentives for firms to adopt best-practice techniques and engage in innovative 
activity, and hence increases the rate of labour productivity growth. Competitive 
pressure arises when entrepreneurs start up new firms and introduce innovative 
managerial practices and new technology to challenge incumbents; and 
 
  the report notes the role of poor regulation in impeding the functioning of 
markets: ―Although government regulation has a clear and vital role to play in 
ensuring that markets operate efficiently, excessive or unnecessary government 
regulation can obstruct efficient market functioning.‖ 
 
  The 2000 report put forward a two pillar framework for government policy to 
strengthen the UK‘s productivity performance based on the dual national/firm analysis:  
  
  first, providing macroeconomic stability to allow firms and individuals to invest 
for the future; and 
 
  second, undertaking microeconomic reforms to ensure that markets function 
  efficiently and tackling barriers to productivity growth.
19 
 
The UK Treasury‘s 2000 report set the stage for a series of further studies issued 
by other UK Government departments and agencies over the following years.   
 
In 2004, the UK Department of Trade and Industry published an important study 
on the benefits of competition by the Centre for Competition Policy at the University of 
East Anglia (Davies, Coles, Olczak, Pike and Wilson, 2004). The study examined six 
market case studies (retail opticians, international telephone calls, net book agreement, 
passenger flights in Europe, new cars, and replica football kits) and provided a powerful 
demonstration of the real world impact of increased competition.  Interestingly, in this 
study the authors caution that there can be ―harmful side-effects‖ of the elimination of 
market imperfections because imperfections were sometimes put in place in the first 
place to help protect some other desirable objective. (Examples in this sample include: 
protection of professional service standards amongst opticians, the stocking of minority 
taste books by booksellers, safety in the skies by regulating air travel.) Nevertheless, in 
the six market studies little conclusive evidence was found that any such harmful side 
effects actually materialized.  Consequently, the authors conclude that the six case studies 
                                                 
19 Recognizing the strong link between competition and productivity, the UK government sought to 
strengthen competition policy by introducing the new Competition Act which came into force in March 
2000. The Act enhanced the powers available to the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to tackle anti-competitive 
practices and abuses of a dominant position. It also introduced strong penalties for transgressors – up to 10 
per cent of UK turnover for each year of the infringement up to a maximum of three years – and ensures 
that the OFT is able to identify and pursue cases of anti-competitive behaviour entirely independently of 
Ministers.  In addition, the UK government provided new market study responsibilities to the country‘s 
competition authority and pioneered the incorporation of competition assessment into the development of 
legislation and government policy.  Since 2002, departments and agencies proposing legislation have been 
required to examine it from a competition perspective as part of the country‘s regulatory impact assessment 
process     36 
were success stories given the often large price reductions, innovation and product 
improvement, typically achieved with little evidence of harmful side effects. 
 
In 2007, the UK‘s Office of Fair Trading (OFT) published Productivity and 
Competition.  In contrast to the UK Treasury and DTI studies, the objectives of this 
report were oriented to the actual and potential role of competition authorities. The 
study‘s specific objectives were to build an understanding of the link between 
competition and productivity by exploring the relevant literature and subsequently 
demonstrating the OFT role in promoting productivity; and to determine how 
productivity analysis might ―help inform the OFT‘s prioritization in terms of identifying 
areas of potential concern (horizon scanning).‖  Nonetheless, a number of the same 
themes touched on the in the UK Treasury‘s report were re-visited.  For example, the 
study identified the following three mechanisms by which competition drives 
productivity:  
 
  Within firm effects through incentives. Competition places pressure on the 
managers of firms to increase internal efficiency by reducing waste and slack (X-
inefficiency);   
 
  Between firm effects through selection. Competition ensures that higher 
productivity firms increase their market share at the expense of the less 
productive. These low productivity firms exit the market, and are replaced by 
higher productivity firms, increasing productivity through a composition or 
―market sorting‖ effect; and  
 
  Innovation. Innovation increases dynamic efficiency through technological 
improvements of production processes (both embodied in investment goods and 
disembodied as in, for example, organizational change), and the creation of new 
products.  
 
With respect to the last of these channels, the OFT study recognizes that the 
relationship between competition and innovation is complex and conclusions depend on 
whether one is focusing on competition in the market or for the market. The OFT 
perceptively points out that the challenge for a competition authority is to ensure that 
there is sufficient incentive to innovate in a situation of competition for the market when 
there is the risk that maintaining this incentive depresses competition in the market. It 
notes that this can be difficult, particularly in industries characterized by network effects. 
In these industries, high concentration ratios may suggest low levels of competition, but 
in fact different systems may be in rigorous competition to become the standard. 
 
The OFT‘s 2007 study recognizes that it is not possible to isolate and quantify 
what part competition has played in the narrowing of the productivity gap between the 
UK and its main competitors. But it points out that improvements in productivity growth 
rates have coincided with major reforms to regulation and anti-trust policy. 
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C.   Australia 
 
  As reported by Gretton (2008) the emergence of national economic reform was a 
gradual process in Australia: ―High trade barriers, and various regulatory and institutional 
impediments culminated during the 1970s and 1980s in poor economic performance 
relative to Australia‘s international peers (Banks, 2005). In recognition of these inhibitors 
of growth, Australian governments embarked on reforms to liberalise Australian capital 
markets, abolish imports quotas and reduce tariff and other assistance to industry. These 
measures increased competitive pressures in the economy which led to greater flexibility 
in Australia‘s previously rigid and highly centralized labour market arrangements and 
institutional and regulatory reforms to promote more efficient delivery of infrastructure 
services (for example, electricity and communications).‖  As reported in this section (and 
drawing in part from the results of the Australian Productivity Commission‘s 2005 
Review of National Competition Policy Reforms) this policy shift has resulted in Australia 
now having the lowest level of product market regulation (tied with the UK) among 
OECD members. The Australian experience holds many lessons for other counties and 
especially for a country like Canada which in many ways is Australia‘s economic twin. 
 
i.  National Competition Policy 
 
  The Australian, State and Territory Governments in 1995 agreed to a 
program of competition policy reform called the National Competition Policy (NCP). 
This set of reforms provided a timely, coordinated and comprehensive approach to 
reform across all levels of government. The NCP sought to establish the conditions 
necessary for effective competition in markets by taking action in four areas:
20 
 
  structural reforms,  including the separation of regulatory and commercial 
  functions, reviewing the merits of separating natural monopoly from potentially 
  contestable service elements and of separating contestable elements into smaller 
  independent businesses; 
 
                                                 
20 In addition to NCP and related infrastructure reforms in electricity, gas, water and road 
transport, Australia‘s program of economic reform over the last two decades has also included extensive 
policy changes in the following areas: 
  Capital markets:  floating of  the Australian dollar, removal of foreign exchange controls and 
capital rationing, and entry of foreign banks; 
  Trade reforms: reductions in tariffs and abolition of quantitative import controls; 
  Infrastructure services (pre NCP):  partial deregulation and restructuring of airlines, 
  coastal shipping, telecommunications and the waterfront; 
  Government services:  competitive tendering and contracting out, performance-based 
  funding and user charges; 
  Labour market policies:  shift from centralized wage fixing to enterprise bargaining; 
  Macroeconomic policy:  inflation targeting; and 
  Taxation reform:  lower corporate and personal tax rate, introduction of a broad-based 
consumption tax  
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  competitive neutrality, involving the adoption of a corporatized governance 
model for significant businesses which remained publicly owned, imposing on 
them similar commercial and regulatory obligations (such as liability for taxes or 
tax equivalent payments, dividends and rate of return requirements) to those 
  faced by private sector businesses, and establishing independent mechanisms for 
  dealing with complaints that these requirements have been breached; 
 
  prices oversight, establishing independent authorities in each jurisdiction to 
  set, administer or oversee prices for enterprises which remained monopoly 
  service providers; and 
 
  third party access arrangements, providing legal avenues for firms to use 
  nationally significant infrastructure services (such as rail networks) owned and 
  operated by others (on ‗reasonable‘ terms and conditions and at ‗fair‘ prices) if 
  commercial negotiations for access to those services are unsuccessful. 
 
  The NCP was based on an explicit recognition that competitive markets will 
generally serve the interests of consumers and the wider community, by providing strong 
incentives for suppliers to operate efficiently and be price competitive and innovative. 
The guiding principle under the NCP was that competition will generally enhance 
community welfare by encouraging greater efficiency. However, the NCP recognized the 
limitations of competition and the importance of distributional issues.
21 Indeed, a key 
principle of NCP was that arrangements that detract from competition should be retained 
if, and only if, they can be shown to be in the public interest.
22 Thus NCP approached 
competition as a means to a higher end, societal welfare, and recognized that that it is 
neither practical nor desirable to promote competition in every activity and circumstance. 
     
 
                                                 
21 This community-wide framework implicitly recognizes that policy change typically involves both 
winners and losers, benefits and costs. While the costs imposed on particular groups need to be taken into 
account, they do not provide a justification for forgoing reforms where those costs are substantially 
outweighed by benefits to the wider community. However, they do point to the need for effective 
implementation mechanisms to ease the burden of adjustment and any significant adverse distributional 
impacts associated with policy change.  
 
22 Governments were given the flexibility, however, to deal with circumstances where competition was 
considered to be inconsistent with social, environmental, equity and regional objectives. Public interest 
factors were to be taken into account in situations where the benefits of a particular policy or action needed 
to be balanced against its costs. These public interest factors included laws and policies relating to 
ecologically sustainable development; social welfare and equity considerations, including community 
service obligations; laws and policies relating to matters such as occupational health and safety, industrial 
relations, access and equity; economic and regional development, including employment and investment 
growth; the interests of consumers generally or a class of consumers; the competitiveness of Australian 
business; and the efficient allocation of resources. Indeed, it was recognized that the reform framework 
provided no guidance on the circumstances in which mechanisms to facilitate adjustment, or to address 
adverse distributional consequences ensuing from the reform process, may be warranted.  
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ii.   Results of the NCP 
   
  The Australian Productivity Commission‘s 2005 Review of National Competition 
Policy Reforms report found that the National Competition Policy (NCP) delivered 
substantial benefits to the Australian community which, overall, have greatly outweighed 
the costs.  According to the Commission, the NCP had:  
 
  contributed to the productivity surge that has underpinned 13 years of continuous 
economic growth, and associated strong growth in household incomes; 
 
  directly reduced the prices of goods and services such as electricity and milk; 
   
  stimulated business innovation, customer responsiveness and choice; 
 
  helped meet some environmental goals, including the more efficient use of water. 
 
The review also found that the benefits from NCP have flowed to both low and high 
income earners, and to country as well as urban-dwelling Australians — though some 
households have been adversely affected by higher prices for particular services and 
some smaller regional communities have experienced employment reductions. With 
respect to productivity growth, the review states that: 
 
While many factors can influence productivity growth, a number of analytical 
studies indicate that microeconomic reforms — including NCP — were a major 
contributor to Australia‘s productivity surge in the 1990s, and to the economy‘s 
increased resilience in the face of economic disturbances. The reforms achieved 
this by increasing the pressures on both private and government businesses to be 
more productive, through increased competition, while simultaneously enhancing 
their capacity to respond through more flexible work arrangements, and the 
removal of unnecessary red tape. (xvii)  
 
  In addition to the impact on productivity, the review found that structural and 
behavioural changes in the economy resulting from the NCP boosted other aspects of 
economic performance:  
 
  Australia‘s trade intensity (the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) rose from 
  27 per cent in the mid 1980s to 44 per cent in 2003; 
 
  inward foreign direct investment (FDI) increased from 17 per cent of GDP in the 
  early 1980s to 30 per cent in 2003, while outward FDI rose from 4 per cent of 
  GDP to 20 per cent over the same period; 
 
  business expenditure on R&D as a proportion of GDP has doubled since the mid 
  1980s; and 
 
  investment in information and communication technologies during the 1990s     40 
  grew at 15 per cent a year — higher than most other OECD economies. 
 
  The report notes that the fact that NCP and other microeconomic reforms yielded 
a significant payoff in productivity and income growth is not surprising. Previous model-
based projections by the Australian Industry Commission suggested that the major 
elements of NCP could potentially generate a net benefit equivalent to 5.5 per cent of 
GDP. More selective analysis done for the report found that the observed productivity 
and price changes in key infrastructure sectors in the 1990s — to which NCP and related 
reforms have directly contributed — have increased Australia‘s GDP by 2.5 per cent, or 
$20 billion. This modeling likely underestimates the total benefits as it does not pick up 
the ‗dynamic‘ efficiency gains from more competitive markets. 
 
  There is wide international recognition that the improvement in Australia‘s 
economic performance is directly linked to economic reform. According to the OECD  
 
  …enhancing product market competition has been central to microeconomic 
  reform in Australia and has been a crucial element in improving general economic 
  performance. Following the trade liberalisation of the 1970s and 1980s, 
  competition in product markets has intensified since 1995, as a result of the 
  National Competition Policy (NCP), the most extensive economic reform 
  programme in Australia‘s history. (OECD 2004b: 120) 
 
  At the sectoral level, strong productivity performance has been directly related to 
the introduction of industry specific reforms. In this context, several specific reviews of 
performance trends in key infrastructure sectors confirm the general improvement in 
productivity growth since NCP (and other) reforms were implemented (although the shift 
to contracting out, or outsourcing, means that some of these estimates may overstate the 
actual improvement). For example, in: 
 
  telecommunications — where entry restrictions have been removed and an 
  industry specific access regime and anti-competitive conduct code introduced — 
  MFP increased by around 7 per cent per year between 1996-97 and 1999-2000; 
 
  rail freight and passenger services — where structural separation of public 
  monopolies and third party access arrangements have been introduced — total 
  factor productivity rose by an average of 8 per cent per year between 1989-90 and 
1997-98; 
 
  postal services — where contestability has been introduced to non standard letter 
  delivery — MFP increased by an average of 3.5 per cent a year between 1992 
  and 2002; 
 
  stevedoring — which has been subject to changes in work arrangements 
  following industrial relations reform and a relaxation of entry restrictions — 
  labour productivity increased by more than 70 per cent between 1995 and 2003; 
  and     41 
 
  key infrastructure sectors which were explicitly the subject of NCP initiatives 
  labour productivity has increased sharply. For example, in electricity generation, 
  labour productivity more than doubled on average across Australia between 1993 
  and 2002 and more than trebled between 1991 and 1999 in Victoria — where 
  reforms were introduced earliest. In gas distribution, labour productivity rose 
  more than six fold between 1991 and 2000. 
 
  As the lags between reform implementation and observed improvements in 
productivity can be quite long, the eventual productivity and growth dividend to Australia 
from NCP (and other) reforms may be considerably higher than observed to date.  
 
D.   The United States 
 
  The US has been a world leader in recognizing the importance of competitive 
forces for raising production efficiencies and consumer welfare and ranks third lowest in 
the OECD in terms of product market regulation.  It was a first mover among OECD 
countries in seeking to deregulate economic activity when, in the late 1970s, it 
deregulated the airline industries.  There is a large academic and business literature on the 
US regulatory experience in relation to competitive intensity, innovation and 
productivity.  Among the more notable contributions, as summarized in this sub-section, 
is that made by Clifford Winston of the Bookings Institution.    
 
  Winston‘s 1993 comprehensive survey of the US deregulation experience, in 
which he quantifies the welfare effects, remains relevant today even as the US enters 
what some may regard as a new regulatory ―cycle‖ (i.e., new financial regulatory regimes 
following the sub-prime mortgage turmoil; new energy efficiency regulatory regimes in 
the face of historically high energy prices).  
 
Winston (1993) defines economic deregulation as the state‘s withdrawal of its 
legal powers to direct the economic conduct (pricing, entry, and exit) of nongovernmental 
bodies.  He writes that:  
 
  Economic deregulation of American industry is one of the most important 
  economic experiments in economic policy in our time. In 1977, 17 per cent of the 
  U.S. GNP was produced by fully regulated industries. By 1988, following ten 
  years of partial and complete economic deregulation of large parts of the 
  transportation, communications, energy, and financial industries that total had 
  been cut significantly – to 6.6 per cent of GDP. (1263) 
 
  Winston ends his survey on the impact of deregulation by concluding:  
 
  Society has gained at least $36-$46 billion (1990 dollars) annually from 
  deregulation primarily in the transportation industries… This amounts to a 7-9 per 
  cent improvement in the part of GNP affected by regulatory reform. The bulk of 
  the benefits have gone to consumers but in contrast to theoretical expectations not     42 
  at the expense of labor or producers; the latter have actually benefited, on net, 
  from reform…Producers in some industries avoided losses by reducing costs from 
  labor and other input suppliers with whom they were sharing rents, by enhancing 
  efficiency through technological and operational innovations, and by tailoring 
  prices and services to customers. (1284-5) 
 
  In terms of the lessons of the US experience with deregulation in the 1980s, 
Winston observes: 
 
  Economists were generally successful in predicting the direction and size of the 
  effects of regulatory reform on prices and profits. They were less successful 
  where deregulation led to substantial changes in firms‘ operations and technology. 
  And their predictions did not adequately incorporate the effects of regulatory 
  reform on services or foresee the extent of price discrimination in certain 
  industries. In addition, they did not always anticipate the importance of 
  supplementary government policies in ensuring deregulation‘s success, and were 
  unable to foresee major changes in external economic factors that dramatically 
  affected some industries‘ performance and clouded assessments. (1286) 
 
  Winston provides an interesting perspective on the issue of whether all industries 
should be deregulated. He notes that the answer would be easy, and positive, if perfect 
competition or optimal ―regulation‖ were accurate characterizations of actual markets or 
regulatory processes. This is of course not the case. In the real world, the choice is 
therefore between imperfect competition and imperfect regulation. He believes that the 
accumulated evidence of the US experience with deregulation suggests that the burden of 
proof should be on those who argue that price and entry competition is not workable. 
Only in these industries would there be a need for economic regulation.        
 
E.   The European Union (EU) 
 
  In addition to the pursuit of market-oriented policies by national governments in 
Europe, the EU also has taken steps to foster competition across the EU. The best known, 
and most successful, initiative has been the open skies policy in air passenger travel, 
which has given Europe the cheapest air fares in the world. Appendix 2 proves details on 
this initiative.  
 
Product market reform has been an important issue for action at the EU level. Key 
instruments for delivering product market reform in the EU are competition, the single 
market, and research policy. As part of the Lisbon strategy developed in 2000, Heads of 
State agreed to full liberalization of the telecommunications market by 2001 and to speed 
up liberalization of energy, postal and transports markets. Indeed, more competition in 
services markets has been an important objective of the Lisbon strategy and the call for a 
fully operational internal market for services in the EU is at the top of the European 
policy agenda (Task Force of the Monetary Policy Committee of the European System of 
Central Banks, 2006). Europeans recognize that limited competition in the service sector     43 
is one of the factors hindering productivity growth in that sector and contributing to 
higher inflation. Indeed, as the Task Force notes: 
 
Overall, a higher level of competition in the services sector would tend to support 
more efficient and flexible market services, facilitate adjustment processes and 
increase the resilience of the euro area to economic shocks. (5)  
 
F.   Other Countries 
 
This sub-section, which draws on Sharpe (2006), briefly reviews competition-
related policies that have fostered productivity growth in three successful European 
countries: Ireland, Sweden, and Finland. 
 
i.   Ireland 
 
  Ireland has enjoyed very strong economic and productivity growth since 1990, the 
payoff of the priority given education, the creation of a favourable environment for 
business and entrepreneurship, and the promotion of free trade, foreign investment and 
monetary union. Commercial, industrial, tax and education policies have all been 
supportive of a rapid pace of productivity growth. Ireland has been identified as a market 
friendly place to invest by multinational firms, a factor that has contributed significantly 
to prosperity. In a review of competition in the Irish economy for the OECD, Rae, Vogt 
and Wise (2006) point out that a pro-competition culture has taken hold in Ireland among 
policymakers and the general public, partly in response to some highly visible successes 
from certain early deregulations. 
 
  However, Rae, Vogt and Wise note that the general openness and outward 
orientation of the Irish economy masks a significant lack of competition in many sectors. 
They point out that Irish success owes more to liberalized labour markets than product 
markets; that the strong economy has hidden the welfare and efficiency losses created by 
insufficient competition in certain sectors; that lack of competition in the utilities sectors 
is only now starting to become a constraint as bottleneck begin to appear; and finally that 
given the very high prices in certain sectors, a striking feature of Irish success has been 
that too many benefits of the boom have been captured by producers rather than 
consumers. They conclude that despite the positive aspects of Irish regulatory regime, 
competition policy enforcement has been weak, reflecting the legacy of policy that has 
favoured the interests of producers over consumers. 
 
ii.   Finland 
 
  Finland‘s economic success in recent years is closely linked to the fortunes of its 
dominant private sector company, Nokia, which has enjoyed world-wide success and 
rapid productivity growth. In contrast, the overall productivity performance of the rest of 
the Finnish economy has not been brilliant as the productivity gains in the high-tech 
sector have not diffused to other industries.  
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  Finland performed somewhat better than average (10
th out of 30 OECD countries) 
on the OECD product market regulation index in 2003, scoring 1.3 out of 6 in 2003, just 
above Canada (1.2). This score represents a considerable improvement from 1998 when it 
scored 2.1, reflecting a trend toward product market deregulation over the period. While 
certainly not as market-oriented as the United Kingdom, Australia, or the United States,  
Finland has nevertheless profited from a number of competition-related initiatives, 
including: the early liberalization of the telcom sector; an historical lack of 
monopolization of the Finnish telephone network by the State, ensuring that competitive 
pressures to invest in R&D existed even before deregulation; and the liberalization of the 
financial sector, leading to better access to capital for IT start-ups. 
    
iii.   Sweden 
 
  Like Finland, Sweden has also exhibited an asymmetrical productivity 
performance, with a highly productive manufacturing sector and a lagging service sector. 
Competition has been identified as the key factor explaining the difference in 
performance. Manufacturing firms must compete in international markets and therefore 
produce products that are innovative, of high quality, and competitively priced. Service 
industries are to a large degree sheltered from such market forces. For example, the retail 
sector is hampered by protective zoning legislation while union rules hinder productivity 
in construction. At a societal level, strict employment protection legislation, a virtually 
flat before and after tax earnings structure that is a remnant of the centralized collective 
bargaining of the past and that is also driven by the extensive income redistribution 
system, and non-uniform corporate tax rules all impede workers and capital from moving 
to firms and positions in which they could be more productive. 
 
  Sweden performed somewhat better than average (8
th out of 30 OECD countries) 
on the OECD product market regulation index in 2003, scoring 1.2 out of 6 in 2003, the 
same as Canada. This score represents an improvement from 1998 when it scored 1.8, 
reflecting a trend toward product market deregulation over the period that was common 
to all OECD countries.  
 
G.   Michael Porter and Associates 
 
  The importance of competition for innovation and productivity growth has been 
an important theme in the work of Michel Porter, starting with his seminal The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations published in 1990. In that book, Porter developed the 
―diamond model‖ to shed light on how the competitive advantage of nations develops 
and evolves over time. Based on research in ten leading trading nations, Porter showed 
how traditional comparative advantages such as natural resources and pools of labour 
have been superseded as sources of prosperity, and how broad macroeconomic accounts 
of competitiveness are insufficient.  
 
  Porter developed the concept of "clusters," or groups of interconnected firms, 
suppliers, related industries, and institutions that arise in particular locations. Sound 
macroeconomic policies and stable political and legal institutions are necessary but not     45 
sufficient conditions to ensure a prosperous economy. Competitiveness is rooted in a 
nation‘s microeconomic fundamentals—the sophistication of company operations and 
strategies and the quality of the microeconomic business environment in which 
companies compete. An understanding of the microeconomic foundations of 
competitiveness is fundamental to national economic policy. A key component in a 
country‘s microeconomic foundations is the state of competition as it is direct 
competition that impels firms to work for increases in productivity and innovation.  
 
  Porter and Associates find that vigorous domestic rivalry promotes success in 
international markets. Porter and Sakakibara (2001) explored the influence of domestic 
competition on international trade performance, using data from a broad sample of 
Japanese industries. Domestic rivalry is measured directly using market share instability 
rather than employing structural variables such as seller concentration. They found robust 
evidence that domestic rivalry has a positive and significant relationship with trade 
performance measured by world export share, particularly when R&D intensity reveals 
opportunities for dynamic improvement and innovation. Conversely, trade protection 
reduces export performance. These findings support the view that local competition - not 
monopoly, collusion, or a sheltered home market - pressures dynamic improvement that 
leads to international competitiveness. 
  
H.   McKinsey Global Institute Productivity Studies 
 
The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) is a think tank based in Washington, D.C., 
founded in 1990 by McKinsey & Company with the objective of analyzing international 
productivity levels from both economic and management perspectives. Over the last 
fifteen years, MGI has studied most of the world‘s major economies.  In each case, MGI 
uses microeconomic analysis on a sector-by-sector level to study the effects that industry 
decisions ultimately have on national productivity.  This sub-section, which draws on 
Sharpe (2006), seeks to synthesize some of the findings of these studies. 
  
Time and again, the MGI‘s studies have returned to the same story in trying to 
explain productivity gaps between countries: a lack of competitive intensity. To the 
extent that certain European and Japanese sectors seem to consistently trail the United 
States in productivity, these sectors are nearly always characterized by a small number of 
domestic firms who engage in little price or service competition because of regulatory 
protection in the form of product market restrictions and trade barriers.  MGI finds that 
such restrictions lead to managerial complacency, a consequent lack of innovation in 
production processes, and ultimately to a productivity performance below that of the 
technological leader.  Potential factors related to competition that have been identified by 
MGI as directly affecting productivity are the following: 
 
  Concentration. A high market share held by a small number of firms is not 
necessarily inconsistent with intense competition.  Concentration can improve 
productivity through achieving economies of scale, and it can also boost 
productivity if it allows a small number of large firms to compete intensely with     46 
each other.  Examples of highly concentrated yet highly competitive industries 
include the Dutch banking industry and the Swedish automobile industry; 
 
  Trade Protection. Tariffs and quotas reduce productivity through shielding 
industries from international competition and so making the adoption of global 
best practices unnecessary.  The automobile industry in Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom, the food processing industry in Japan, and many Swedish 
service industries are all examples highlighted by MGI of industries whose 
productivity performance has been hindered by trade protection; and 
 
  Deregulation. MGI highlights the airline, telecommunications and banking 
industries as cases in which deregulation has boosted productivity, and in which 
countries that have chosen to delay or forgo deregulation have consequently 
suffered lower productivity levels than the early deregulators. 
 
Other competition-related factors can affect productivity in a more indirect 
fashion.  These include: 
 
  Minimum Wages. Higher wages typically have the effect of reducing the number 
of low-skill jobs, as the benefit of these low-skill services is outweighed by the 
higher cost of providing them.  While this has the effect of raising conventionally-
measured average labour productivity, MGI argues that overall ―service 
productivity‖ is negatively affected because the range of services that is offered 
shrinks; 
 
  Work Rules. MGI recognizes that some labour market inflexibilities can be 
beneficial.  However, collective agreement terms that are not adjustable to market 
realities can negatively affect productivity by preventing productivity-enhancing 
reorganizations of work; and 
 
  Zoning Laws. Some European countries have zoning regulations that have a 
negative impact on productivity by making it difficult for firms to purchase 
parcels of land of a required size, and through creating an artificial scarcity of 
land and thereby making land overly expensive.  This affects productivity because 
high rents hinder the ability of smaller firms to innovate, and because larger firms 
have difficulties achieving optimal scale. 
 
Perhaps even more important than the market conditions under which a firm 
operates is the way its managers choose to react to those conditions.  Competition is the 
main driver of managerial innovation, but that managerial innovation (or lack thereof) is 
what affects productivity, first at the firm level, then the industry level, and ultimately at 
the national level.  MGI makes the following observations related to managerial 
innovation: 
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  Best Practice. Managers need to be aware of best practices in a given industry, 
and be prepared to implement them.  MGI states that sufficient exposure to 
competition will ensure that this is the case; 
 
  Human Capital. MGI finds little evidence that labour skills at the production 
level differ greatly across countries.  However, the qualifications of managers can 
have a significant impact on productivity, through entrepreneurship and the 
training of production workers; 
 
  Marketing. MGI finds that the U.S. telecommunications sector‘s productivity 
performance has been positively affected through marketing, since the resulting 
greater demand for telecommunication services means that there is greater output 
for a given investment in fixed capital; 
 
  Information Technology. Although few would dispute that investment in 
information technology can have a significant impact on productivity growth, 
MGI concludes that realizing its full benefit requires an appropriate application.  
In addition to the effect of IT use on productivity growth, the presence and strong 
productivity performance of industries producing IT goods also positively affect 
overall manufacturing productivity growth; and 
 
  Capital Intensity. MGI finds that improvements in capital intensity are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for improvements in productivity.  This is 
because increasing the amount of capital per worker does not necessarily mean 
that the capital is being used efficiently.  Improvements in capital productivity are 
often dependent on other managerial and competitive factors. 
 
Diana Farrell (2003), a McKinsey executive, in an influential paper published in 
the Harvard Business Review has made the case that rather than springing from the 
internet, the real new economy of the 1990s emerged from intensifying business 
competition and a resulting surge in managerial innovation. She argues that information 
technology is of great, but not primary importance, to the fate of industries and individual 
companies. This view is based on the finding that three quarters of productivity gains in 
the United States in the late 1990s were concentrated in six sectors (retailing, securities 
brokerages, wholesaling, semiconductors, computer assembly, and telecommunications) 
representing only one third of GDP and that in these industries there was little correlation 
between productivity and IT investment. Farrell argues that intensifying competition lead 
to productivity-boosting innovations in the six key sectors. She states: 
 
In sectors where competition was promoted – through the dismantling of 
regulatory constraints, primarily – innovation flourished and productivity soared. 
But wherever regulation or other forces warped the competitive environment, 
competitive pressures eased, innovations failed to develop or to spread rapidly, 
and productivity growth slackened.    
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  The key objective of the section has been to show that the international 
experience provides strong support for the position that from the point of view of 
innovation and productivity performance, the regulatory and governance frameworks 
affecting public policy that are least restrictive in their impact on the competitive 
environment or competitive intensity produce superior economic results. The experience 
of the UK, Australia, the United States, and OECD countries in general certainly show 
that a move to a more competitive economic environment improves economic 
performance. While there can be negative implications for certain groups from such 
policy changes, the evidence shows that such effects are often smaller than anticipated 
and that the productivity gains arising from the change can be used to fund  compensation 
from the winners (often all members of society through lower prices) to the losers.   
 
I.   Case Industry Studies 
   
The appendices to this report contain two case studies of the relationship between 
competitive intensity and innovation and productivity, one from Canada and one from 
Europe. The first study is on European air passenger transport industry, the second on the 
Canadian wine industry. These case studies of product market regulation provide support 
for the proposition that there should be a policy presumption in favour of competitive 
markets to the extent that such markets can enable innovation and productivity growth. 
The key findings from the studies are summarized below. 
 
   The deregulation of air passenger transport in Europe in the 1990s has effectively 
turned the high cost-low productivity European air passenger industry into a globally 
competitive industry. The lessons from this experience are threefold. First, providing 
consumers with substantially lower prices can stimulate demands and create new markets 
for the industry when the price elasticity of demand for the industry is high. Second, 
deregulation can produce major gains to consumers without damaging the long-term 
profitability of firms if they can adjust their business strategies properly. Third, open and 
free competition is of crucial importance for productivity growth in an industry since it 
encourages entrepreneurial activity and industry innovation.  
 
  The Canadian wine industry was very weak before the Canada-U.S. FTA in terms 
of product quality and capability to adapt and innovate. The implementation of the FTA 
has dramatically reshaped the industry, instigating a major program to uproot native 
grape varieties and replant them with high quality European grapes. This diversification, 
as well as the creation of VQA standards, development of winery tourism, and promotion 
of unique products, has given Canadian wineries world-class reputations. The successful 
transformation of the Canadian wine industry has shed light on how increased foreign 
competition can drive innovation and enhance the competitiveness of an inward-looking 
industry. First, government protective measures for an industry, or a defensive strategy of 
avoiding competition, while potentially generating short-run market advantages, cannot 
ensure the long-run survival of an industry. Second, government programs, such as the 
subsidies provided grape growers to switch from Labrusca to Vinifera grapes, can foster 
the innovations needed to adapt to new competitive conditions. Third, industry 
competitiveness can be enhanced by the establishment of rigid product quality standards.     49 
As a whole, surviving competition enhances an industry‘s capability to innovate and 
hence improves its performance.  
   
 
V   Conclusion  
   
  The objective of this report has been to survey and assess the literature on the 
relationship between competitive intensity and productivity and innovation. The evidence 
in favour of more open and competitive markets as drivers of innovation and productivity 
is overwhelming. In the academic literature there is a debate about the existence of an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between innovation and competition related to 
Schumpeter‘s famous theory that monopoly can foster innovation. Innovation is said to 
rise with increases in competition up to a point and then fall. But this relationship is 
fragile, and more important, has little, if any, policy relevance. As Peter Howitt (2007), a 
leading growth economist in principle favourable to the Schumpeterian perspective has 
recently written, competition policy should not be relaxed in hopes of boosting 
innovation because more competition actually strengthens the incentive to innovate.   
 
  The work that has been done on firm dynamics and international experience 
provides strong support for the position that from the point of view of innovation and 
productivity performance, the regulatory and governance frameworks affecting public 
policy that are least restrictive in their impact on the competitive environment or 
competitive intensity produce superior economic results.  
 
While there can be negative implications for certain groups from such policy 
changes, the evidence shows that such effects are often smaller than anticipated. 
Nevertheless, in cases where there are losers, while economists may talk about 
compensating them, in practice, there is often little follow-up. The reality is that a 
movement toward more competitive marketplaces affects both income distribution and 
poverty. It is likely that the net effect of this movement reduces absolute poverty by 
decreasing prices for the products purchased by the poor. Advocates of more competitive 
markets would be wise to make this point better known in order to broaden support for 
such policies.  
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Appendix 1: The European Air Passenger Transport Industry: An 
Example of the Dramatic Effect of Deregulation 
 
  In postwar Europe, aviation markets were regulated by bilateral agreements that 
confined the market to one airline per country.  Based on this regulatory environment, air 
travel in Europe was dominated by national flag carriers such as British Airways, Air 
France, Alitalia, Lufthansa and Belgium's Sabena. These airlines had a virtual monopoly 
in their host countries over prime flight times and airport slots and did not compete on 
price, services or capacities. The economic rent from protectionism in the sector was  
absorbed by a combination of high wage costs and low productivity. As a result, 
European air fares were the highest in the world and Europe's share of world aviation was 
falling steadily compared to its counterparts (Barrett, 1996).  
  However, the deregulation of the industry both at the multilateral level through 
the institutions of the European Community and at a bilateral level through negotiations 
between individual countries has reshaped the markets, ―making cheap flights a habit for 
millions of people, giving birth to a host of low-budget rivals while driving state-
subsidized air carriers into bankruptcy‖ (Frankel, 2004). The increased competition 
within the industry allowed airlines to lower operation costs and enhanced the number of 
air routes served. The deregulation has led to substantial benefits for consumers as 
average passenger fares has fallen dramatically. Around 90 per cent of passengers on 
intra-European routes have enjoyed reduced fares since 1995 (Button, 2004). A study 
conducted by the European Commission (2001) estimates that the price of promotional 
fares fell by 41 per cent between 1992 and 2000. European air passenger transport is now 
characterized by the lowest prices in the world.  
 
  This case study briefly summarizes Europe‘s liberalization experience in the air 
travel industry. It focuses in particular on the emergence of European low-cost airlines 
(LCA), which since deregulation have introduced many innovative services and reshaped 
the competitive environment within the market. It first briefly describes the industry 
characteristics in terms technical efficiency and productivity growth prior to the 
deregulation. Then it reviews the framework for the European aviation liberalization and 
investigates the most striking changes have occurred in the industry due to the 
liberalization, emphasizing the important operating innovations of the LCAs. Finally it 
concludes on the lessons from the positive experience of European liberalization.  
 
The European Air Passenger Transport Industry Prior to Deregulation 
 
  Prior to deregulation, the European air passenger transport industry was largely 
based on a restrictive regime of bilateral agreements, which only allowed one airline from 
each country to operate services on a limited number of specified routes. In most cases, 
the capacity on international routes was divided at a rigid 50:50 between countries. Any 
change to fares required approval by both governments concerned.  
 
  Under this regulation framework, the European air passenger transport industry     67 
was dominated by state-owned operators, the so-called ―flag carriers.‖ True competition 
was absent. These flag carriers often regarded the attainment of certain public policy 
objectives (such as providing employment or maintaining uneconomic services to remote 
locations) as their primary function. Consequently, efficiency in the provision of services 
was of secondary importance and often not even an area of managerial concern (Kangis 
and O‘Reilly, 2003). As a result, the European air passenger transport industry was 
characterized by high costs and low productivity.  
 
  MacGowan et al. (1989) provide striking evidence on this issue. Their 
calculations show that in 1987, six out of seven European national carriers paid their staff 
more than double, with three paying more than triple, US rates. These differentials did 
not reflect labour productivity differences since average US labour productivity was more 
than double that in Europe!  
 
  Good et al.(1993) compared technical efficiency among four European flag 
carriers (Air France, Alitalia, British Air, and Lufthansa ) and eight of their American 
counterparts from 1976 through 1986. They found that US carriers were nearly 15 per 
cent more efficient throughout the study period than European airlines. The result also 
shows that ―bringing all European airlines up to the US performance average in 1986 
would have saved the entire European airline industry approximately $4 billion (in 1986 
prices) annually which is about 16 per cent of total operating costs.‖ 
 
The Deregulation Process 
 
  At the beginning of the 1980s, forces questioning the traditional European air 
passenger regulation regime began to appear, mainly from the European Commission 
itself.
23 The successful deregulation of civil aviation in the United States in the late 1970s  
also played an important role in triggering bilateral liberalization reform in Europe. 
However, the initiatives moving toward liberalization at the two different levels, bilateral 
and continent-wide, took more than a decade to complete.  
 
  In early 1980s, certain European countries such as the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Germany signed liberal bilateral agreements with the 
United States on their North-Atlantic routes, allowing free entry, and price and capacity 
competition. These countries then introduced liberal bilateral agreements among 
themselves between 1984 and 1986. Because of these agreements flag carriers from these 
countries began to face strong competition both on the North-Atlantic routes and on intra-
European routes. They were forced to adopt new business strategies to meet the 
challenges.  
 
    During the same period, the EC released several reports recommending the 
gradual deregulation of the air passenger industry. It approved the first deregulation 
                                                 
23 For example, Encaoua (1991) notes that European non-scheduled charter companies, which were 
exempted from the bilateral agreements, wanted a more liberal framework. He also mentions that some 
European countries such as the United Kingdom and Netherlands were in favour of transport airline 
liberalization.     68 
package in 1987. This package, although allowing limited competition in prices and 
capacities and restricted entry, was far from a complete deregulation of air passenger 
travel industry in Europe.  It was only in 1997 that the formal deregulation of the industry 
was finally completed. Since then, any technically qualified European airline has been 
able to operate on any route in the region, including domestic routes, without any 
restraints on price or capacity. 
 
The Impact of Deregulation 
 
  Since deregulation, fundamental changes have taken place in the European air 
passenger transport industry. Competition has increased dramatically. Services offered by 
the airlines have improved, giving consumers greater choice. Air fares have fallen 
precipitously, triggering demand for greater air passenger services. 
 
Increased Competition  
 
  Liberalization gave all European-owned and controlled airlines equal rights of 
access to all markets in the Community. This broke the national flag carriers‘ monopoly 
in the skies. An important effect of the deregulation policy has been the development of 
low-cost airlines (LCA) such as Ryanair, Easyjet, Virgin Express and Debonair. These 
airlines based their business strategy on a simple no-frill product. They introduced many 
innovations to lower operating costs, which allowed them to offer consumers very low 
prices. With this strategy, LCAs expanded rapidly and by the end of 2000 had taken 
about 10 per cent of domestic and intra-European market (European Commission, 2003). 
In the United Kingdom where the liberalization process started relatively early, the share 
of passengers carried by LCAs had grown to 20 per cent by 2000. The emergence of 
LCAs imposed direct competition to existing airlines and forced the traditional flag 
carriers to innovate to maintain their market shares.   
 
  According to the European Commission (2003), although the total number of 
European-owned airlines that offer scheduled services did not increase much between 
1992 and 2000 (from 124 to 131), the number of airlines exiting and entering the market  
were considerable. Only half of the airlines present at the start of 1993 still operated 
scheduled routes under their own code by 2000. In the same time, the lowering of barriers 
to entry allowed many new airlines to establish within the liberalized area: an average of 
more than 20 new carriers per year have been set up since 1993 (European Commission 
1999). This market churning illustrates how the growth in competition changed the 
structure of the industry. 
 
Improved Services  
 
  Increased competition has expanded the range of choice available to consumers 
by increasing the number of routes covered and the flexibility of flights offered. The total 
number of routes operated by the European-owned airlines increased 46 per cent from 
1992 to 2000. The number of routes where more than two carriers competed rose 49 per 
cent over the same period (Chart 1). LCAs introduced most of the new routes.      69 
 
Chart 1: Changes in Intra-EU Air Routes and Competition in the European Air Travel 
Industry 
 
Source: European Commission (2001). 
 
  In order to attract passengers, many European airlines introduced innovations to 
decrease their operating cost while at the same time still offering high standard of 
services. For example, most LCAs use the websites to sell tickets, which gives consumers 
greater convenience since the online sale is open 7 days a week 24 hours a day. 
 
Fall in Air Fares  
  
  The emergence of LCAs increased competition on the basis of price, making air 
travel affordable for a much broader segment of the population. For example, on routes 
with two competitive airlines in 2001, business and economy fares were 17 per cent and 
24 per cent lower, respectively, than in 1992 (European Commission, 2001). Fares on 
routes between Ireland and the UK had even fallen by as much as 70 per cent during the 
1990s (Barrett, 2000). Moreover, the number of promotional fares available in each flight 
has also increased and the prices of promotional fares generally decreased 41 per cent 
from 1992 to 2000. Some airlines even provide free tickets, with certain conditions.  
 
  Since the price elasticity of demand is relatively high in the air passenger travel 
industry, lower airfares have greatly increased demand for air travel. As a result, the 
number of air travel passengers in Europe increased three-fold between 1980 and 2000 
(Collaborative Forum of Air Transport Stakeholders, 2003).  
 
The Innovations of LCAs: A Case Study 
 
  As noted above, a very important effect of air passenger transport deregulation in 
Europe has been the emergence of low cost airlines (LCAs), which have completely 
reshaped the industry. Through innovations, these new entrants have not only 
successfully competed with existing air carriers, but they have also created new markets 
by taking business from other modes of  passenger transport such as railways. Compared     70 
to traditional scheduled airlines, the main operating features of LCAs are:
24 
 
  absence of expensive ticket sale offices in the cities they serve and reliance of cost-
effective web-based or telephone reservation systems;  
 
  elimination of non-essential in-flight services such as beverage and meal services, 
reducing input and labour costs; 
 
  unrestricted seating arrangement to reduce boarding time; 
 
  use of secondary airports to reduce airport charges and increase turn-around times; 
and 
 
  leasing rather than purchasing aircrafts, allowing rapid changes in schedules in 
response to market demand.  
 
  By applying these strategies, many LCAs in Europe have challenged the existing 
airlines and driven the whole industry to reduce costs and increase productivity. The most 
successful story is Ryanair, Europe‘s first and largest LCA. Adopting a low cost strategy 
similar to the one pioneered by Southwest Airlines in the United States, Ryanair entered 
the European air market in 1985. It reduced travel agent commission from 9 per cent to 
7.5 per cent; developed its own telemarketing system; established services to lesser-used 
airports; and achieved a 25 minute turnaround time compared to 45-60 minutes for rival 
airlines (Barrett, 1999).  
 
  These innovations helped Ryanair achieve remarkable labour and aircraft 
productivity. This situation leads to low prices which in turn attract increasing numbers 
of passengers. This success represented a major threat to Ryanair‘s main rival – the 
national flag carrier, Aer Lingus. In this competitive environment, both airlines reduced 
unit costs.  Chart 2a and b show the annual passenger traffic carried by Ryanair and Aer 
Lingus between 1997 and 2003 and their respective falling unit cost levels over this 
period.  
 
Based on these strategic innovations, Ryanair has become the most profitable 
airline company in the world. In 2006, Ryanair became the world's first airline to carry 
more than 4 million international passengers in one month. By the end of this decade, 





                                                 
24 See Pender and Baum (2000) for detailed discussion of operating features of LCAs. 
25 Ryanair (2007): About us, available online at 
http://www.ryanair.com/site/EN/about.php?page=About.     71 
 
 
Chart 2a: Annual Passengers Carried by Ryanair and Aer Lingus, 1997-2003 
 
 
Chart 2b: Annual Unite Cost of Ryanair and Aer Lingus, 1997-2003 
 
 






  The successive packages of liberalizing measures have effectively turned the high 
cost-low productivity European air passenger industry into a globally competitive 
industry with a high productivity performance. The lessons from deregulation of the 
European air travel industry are threefold. First, providing consumers with substantially 
lower prices can stimulate demands and create new markets for the industry when the 
price elasticity of demand for the industry is high. Second, deregulation can produce     72 
major gains to consumers without damaging the long-term profitability of firms if they 
can adjust their business strategies properly. Third, open and free competition is of 
crucial importance for productivity growth in an industry since it encourages 
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Appendix 2: The Transformation of the Canadian Wine Industry: 
Innovation from International Competition 
 
  The transformation of the Canadian wine industry ―from a weak, inward-looking 
industry to a prize-winning international competitor‖ is an excellent illustration of the 
role of open and competitive markets driving innovation and productivity growth (Hart, 
2005:6). Two decades ago, Canadian wineries used native-based grape species such as 
Vitis Labrusca to make wines.
26 These wines had a peculiar ―foxy‖ taste and were of little 
interest to sophisticated consumers. Canadian wine was considered much inferior to that 
of Europe, the United States, and other wine-producing regions. However, because of 
trade barriers, as well as differential mark-ups and discriminatory listing practices by 
monopoly retail outlets, the Canadian wine industry was well sheltered from global 
competition and was able to survive at a low level. Wineries has little incentive to 
innovate even though Canadian consumers were leaning increasingly toward drier table 
wines made from quality wine grapes (Vitis Vinifera).
27  
 
  During the 1980s, the signing of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 
along with a ruling under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) forced 
Canada to open domestic wine markets to higher-quality, lower-priced international 
rivals. In facing up to the increased competition, the industry had to introduce a series of 
innovations to improve the quality of its product. Today, the Canadian wine industry, 
although relatively small, is internationally recognized: wineries are producing quality 
wines, particularly ice wines, many of which have garnered awards and praise from 
international wine connoisseurs.  
 
  As the industry was enhancing its reputation, it experienced growth at a 
remarkable pace. From 1993 to 2005, real output increased at an average annual rate of 
7.1 per cent, more than double that of the overall economy (Hope-Rose, 2006:6). This 
growth rate was the eleventh highest rate among the 215 industry groups. 
   
  This case study examines the main innovations in the Canadian wine industry 
driven by the intensive competition arising from the implementation of the FTA. It begins 
with a brief introduction of the industry and the FTA. The changes of policy, production 
and consumption affecting the industry are then reviewed. It concludes with some 
important lessons from the industry transformation after being exposed to foreign 
competition through FTAs.   
 
Industry Structure  
 
  In Canada, grape farmers have an important stake in the wine industry. About 80 
per cent of the grapes grown in Canada are used for wine production (Bradshaw, 2004). 
Grape production is concentrated in four provinces: Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec 
                                                 
26 Vitis Labrusca is a species of table grapes native to North America. Today they are grown mainly for 
juices, jams and the fresh fruit market.   
27 Vitis Vinifera is a vine species of European origin, known for its ability to produce the finest grapes for 
wine.      75 
and Nova Scotia. In 2001, southern Ontario accounted for 70 per cent of total grape 
acreage, British Columbia was the second with 27 per cent, and the remainder was mostly 
divided between Quebec and Nova Scotia. The two leading wine grape regions in Canada 
are the Niagara Peninsula in Ontario and the Okanagan Valley in British Columbia.  
 
  The wine industry in Ontario and British Columbia is closely linked to the grape-
growing sector and, as such, is directly affected by provincial agricultural policies. In 
Ontario, the vintners negotiate annually with the grape growers represented by the 
Ontario Grape Growers (OGG) to set grape prices. In British Columbia, the grape market 
is not regulated and growers and wineries contract privately with each other.  
 
  On the output side, policies affecting the sale and distribution of wine are 
regulated through provincial liquor control board outlets. The Liquor Control Board of 
Ontario (LCBO) is the main organization that shapes the production and distribution of 
wine in Ontario. In British Columbia, there are two branches of government that are 
responsible for regulating and monitoring the liquor industry: the Liquor Control and 
Licensing Branch (LCLB) and the Liquor Distribution Branch (LDB).  
 
Industry Protection Prior to the FTA 
 
  Twenty years ago, the Canadian wine industry was well protected through trade 
barriers based on the following regulations and practices.  
 
  Restrictive listing requirements for foreign wines. The provincial liquor boards 
determined  which  wines  are  allowed  to  be  sold  through  their  listing  practice. 
Restrictive  listing  practices  toward  foreign  wines  made  it  difficult  for  foreign 
wine producers to be listed in Canada. According to Heien and Sims (2000), there 
were no California wines on the LCBO list in 1970s and by 1987 only 3 per cent 
of the wines listed in Canada were from the United States.   
 
  Differential mark-ups for domestic wines and imported wines. The makeup was a 
fixed percentage of retail prices, determined by the provincial government and 
paid  by  the  Canadian  wine  consumers.  The  disparity  between  domestic  and 
import  mark-ups  was  substantial.  For  example,  the  LCBO  marked  up  foreign 
wines by 60 per cent as compared to a mark-up of 1 per cent for Ontario wines 
(Mytelka and Goertzen, 2004).  
 
  Other nontariff barriers such as blending requirements, additional cost of services 
and  floor  prices.  In  British  Columbia,  the  B.C.  Grape  Grower  Association 
(BCGGA) enforced a 80/20 regulation affecting the domestic content of wines 
labelled as a product of British Columbia.  Domestic wines had to have an 80 per 
cent B.C. grape content. Ontario, New Brunswick and British Columbia also had 
implemented  ―steep‖  cost  of  services  differentials  on  foreign  wines.  These 
provinces also set a floor price or a reference price for U.S. wines (Heien and 
Sims, 2000). 
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  As a result of these restrictive practices, imported wine listed in Canada was 
limited, and also was more expensive than domestic wine. Thus these government 
protective measures favoured inefficient domestic wine producers in Canada. Although 
there were dramatic changes in wine consumption patterns toward drier wines made from 
European Vinifera varieties (initially whites, such as Chardonnay, Riesling and 
Sauvignon Blanc, more recently reds, Cabernet Sauvignon, Merlot and Syrah), the 
Canadian wine industry in the mid 1980s was still largely based on hardy native species 
grapes (Labrusca) and had little incentive or interest in introducing innovations. Not 
surprisingly, Canadian consumers preferred beer or hard liquor which, which while also 
over-priced, was at least drinkable. 
 
Industry Innovation in Response to Foreign Competition  
 
  The signing of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in the late 1980s 
shook the Canadian wine industry dramatically and forced Canadian grape farmers and 
wineries to confront competitive pressures from the United States. An important 
component of the agreement was the lessening of the restrictions on the importation and 
marketing of wine produced in the United States as well as the removal of tariffs on U.S. 
wines in Canada. More specifically, the agreement required elimination of two wine-
related discriminatory practices (listing practices and differential mark-ups) and required 
Canada to treat U.S. wines as if they were domestic wines. In 1987, a GATT ruling 
accepted by Parliament that condemned Canadian restrictions on imported beer and wine 
also drove Canada to abandon the protective measures offered to the domestic wine 
industry. Under the terms of these agreements, foreign wines would be treated no less 
favourably than Canadian wines. 
 
  To  compete,  Canadian  winemakers  needed  to  produce  high  quality  wines 
comparable to the foreign wines sought by Canadian consumers. With the support of 
provincial and federal governments, the Canadian wineries undertook a series of industry 
innovations  to  remain  competitive  by  improving  quality. The  innovations  included:  a 
switch to higher quality grapes; the establishment of VQA standards; development of 
wine tourism; and promotion of ice wine. All four innovations are discussed below. 
 
Switch to Higher Quality Grapes 
 
  Wine making in Canada has a history of more than two centuries. But the modern 
era in Canadian winemaking only began in 1990s in response to the FTA and GATT.  
As noted, prior to  the  FTA, the Canadian wine industry  was  mainly  based on hardy 
grapes such as French hybrids and Vitis Labrusca that could be grown successfully in 
native  vineyards.  The  government  protective  measures  toward  these  inferior  wines 
discouraged the planting of the riskier but higher quality European wine grapes known as 
Vitis  Vinifera. The  implementation  of  the  FTA  and  GATT  has  changed  the  story.  In 
response to the demand for the higher quality wine grapes, grape growers moved away 
from native Labrusca in favor of new Vinifera that produce higher quality wines.  
 
  Since it takes three or four years for a grapevine to produce a crop and five years     77 
for a grapevine to become fully productive, the movements from Labrusca to Vinifera 
posed a great risk on grape growers. Government assistance reduced risk and thus was a 
powerful  force  to  encourage  the  transformation  of  the  grape-growing  industry.  The 
Ontario Wine Assistance Programme (OWAP) of 1988, for example, provided funds to 
pull up  Labrusca  and Hybrid vines in  the period from  1988 to  the early  1990s, and 
provided ―sugar bonuses‖ to encourage the planting of Vinifera grapes and the use of 
newer viticulture techniques that produce grapes of high quality for the wine sector from 
1988 to 2000 (Mytelka and Goertzen, 2004:8). In British Columbia, a jointly funded 
federal/provincial  program,  the  Grape  and  Wine  Adjustment  Assistance  Program 
(GWAAP) was also introduced in the late 1980s to assist the industry‘s movement toward 
quality  grapes  and  grape  growers  received  about  $28  million  to  aid  to  remove  the 
unwanted grape varieties and to subsidize purchasing and growing quality grapes (Carew, 
1998:249).  
 
  These government-supported programs greatly stimulated the switch from 
Labrusca to Vinifera. By 2005, the acreage of Vinifera varieties planted in Canada had 
virtually doubled from 11,276 acres in 1993 to 21,825 acres. On the other hand, farmers 
had only 4,280 acres of the old Labrusca varieties, down from 5,854 (Chart 1). And the 
trend towards planting Vinifera grapes for premium wines is expected to continue. 
 



















Note: Data for 1999-2001 are confidential. 
Source: Hope-Rose, Penny (2006) ―From the Vine to the Glass:  Canada‘s Grape and 
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Establishment of VQA Standards 
 
  The introduction of the Vintners Quality Alliance (VQA) standard further boosted 
the demand for Vinifera grapes for wine production. A VQA symbol on a wine label 
guarantees that the wine has satisfied a rigorous testing and audit process. In order to 
receive a VQA symbol on a wine bottle, the independent inspection process begins in the 
vineyard, continues throughout wine production and finishes with independent wine-
tasting panels, which conduct a blind tasting of bottled samples of the wine before giving 
approval (Bradshaw, 2004). This premium product guarantee has given the Canadian 
wine industry a solid foundation from which to promote the wine industry in Canada as 
well as around the world. 
 
The Ontario wine industry developed voluntary VQA standard in 1988. British 
Columbia followed two years later. The VQA Ontario was then designated as Ontario‘s 
wine authority in 1998 under the VQA Act, 1999. It is responsible for administering the 
VQA Act and its regulations under a detailed agreement with the Minister of Government 
Services. The VQA Act establishes an "Appellation of Origin" system by which 
consumers can identify quality wines made in Ontario based on the origin of grapes used, 
production methods and other standards. In 2006, VQA Ontario sales represented 18.8 
per cent of all Ontario wine sales (Wine Council of Ontario, 2006). 
 
Development of the Wine Tourism 
 
  In response to competition, the Canadian wine industry has developed a value-
added  innovation:  winery  tourism  to  support  the  marketing  for  quality  wines.  Wine 
companies use their wineries and vineyards as tourist attractions. Visitors are charged a 
fee for a winery tour, and to take part in activities such as grape harvesting and wine 
tasting. Winery tourism in Canada has become a unique competitive advantage over other 
wine regions. According to the Wine Council of Ontario(WCO), the industry attracted 
750,000 winery visitors in 2006. These visits are the primary sales channel for many 
WCO member wineries. 
 
Promotion of Ice Wine 
 
  The promotion of unique or signature products such as ice wines is another means 
by which the Canadian wine industry has adapted to trade liberalization. The commercial 
production of Canadian ice wine started as early as 1970s. However, it was not until the 
commencement of the FTA, that the production of ice wines increased dramatically. 
Canadian ice wine has earned the highest awards at many of the world's most prestigious 
wine fairs, including Vinexpo and VinItaly. Today Canada is the largest producer of this 
rare, rich and sweet wine, with the largest share coming from Ontario's Niagara 
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Conclusion 
 
  The Canadian wine industry was very weak before the Canada-U.S. FTA in terms 
of product quality and capability to adapt and innovate. The implementation of the FTA 
has dramatically reshaped the industry, instigating a major program to uproot native 
grape varieties and replant them with high quality European grapes. This diversification, 
as well as the creation of VQA standards, development of winery tourism, and promotion 
of unique products, has given Canadian wineries world-class reputations.  
 
  The successful transformation of the Canadian wine industry has shed light on 
how increased foreign competition can drive innovation and enhance the competitiveness 
of an inward-looking industry. First, government protective measures for an industry, or a 
defensive strategy of avoiding competition, while potentially generating short-run market 
advantages, cannot ensure the long-run survival of an industry. Second, government 
programs, such as the subsidies provided grape growers to switch from Labrusca to 
Vinifera grapes, can foster the innovations needed to adopt to a new competitive 
conditions. Third, industry competitiveness can be enhanced by the establishment of rigid 
product quality standards. As a whole, surviving competition enhances an industry‘s 
capability to innovate and hence improves its performance. The more rapidly industries 
accumulate competitive experience, the faster they learn and the more successful they 
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